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ABSTRACT
Aims
Traditionally, psychoses and neuroses have been thought of as being very different in
nature. More recently it has been recognised that there may be similarities between
these groups in terms of their symptoms in the context of the continuum model. It has
been suggested that people with psychosis as well as people with panic disorder
experience similar internal experiences (thoughts, emotions, body state information)
but interpret them in different ways. This study seeks to explore the extent to which
individuals who experience delusions and those who experience panic arc similar in
terms of their interpretations of common somatic symptoms and to explore other
factors which have been implicated in causing and maintaining delusions. This has
implications for the further understanding and treatment ofdelusions.
Design
This study used a between groups design and was based on an opportunity sample of
inpatients in a psychiatric ward and out patients attending clinical psychology and
psychiatry departments.
Methods
Three groups of participants were recruited for this study which included 16 people
who were experiencing delusions, 11 people who were experiencing panic disorder,
and 15 healthy individuals who have no previous history of mental health problems.
The participants filled in self report questionnaires measuring somatic attributions;
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metacognitions; experiential avoidance; state/trait anxiety; delusion proneness; self-
esteem and emotionality.
Results
Significant differences were found between the clinical groups and the healthy control
group on scores for all 7 measures, supporting the hypotheses regarding the
similarities between delusional and panic disordered patients compared with healthy
controls. Remarkably, there were no significant differences between the clinical
groups, although there is partial support for the idea that the clinical groups interpreted
somatic symptoms differently, however, this is tentative.
Discussion
Overall, the results provide support for the continuum model of psychosis and
Morrison's theory that people who experience panic and those who experience
delusions process internal events in a similar way. These results also inadvertently
suggest that anomalous internal experiences may be necessary in order for delusional
beliefs to occur. However, further research is needed for validation of these results.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1: Overview
Morrison (2001) has suggested that people with psychosis as well as people with
panic disorder interpret internal experiences (thoughts, emotions, body state
information) in a similar way. He suggests that people who experience panic interpret
symptoms in a catastrophic but understandable way, e.g. heart attack, fainting etc. and
that people who experience psychosis attribute symptoms to delusional explanations
that are unlikely given the evidence, e.g. poisoning, alien control, spirit attack etc. On
the surface it appears that these interpretations are very different, however, they share
similarities such as both are based on similar stimuli, both are misinterpretations of
internal experiences, both have undesirable consequences, and both have the potential
to play a role in the development and maintenance of the problem.
Recent research has suggested that there are a number of similarities between panic
and delusional groups. However, historically, the wider categories of neuroses
including panic, and psychoses including delusions, have been classified in different
diagnostic categories which have contributed to their separate study and treatment
(Freeman & Garety, 2003). Yet, if you look closely at both groups' interpretations of
their experiences they are very similar. For example, someone experiencing
persecutory delusions may interpret anxiety symptoms as proof that the FBI are
following them, and someone experiencing panic interprets their anxiety symptoms as
proof that they may die of a heart attack. In these examples both interpretations are
unlikely to be true, both are misinterpretations of anxiety related symptoms, and both
implicate that something bad is going to happen to them. Morrison (2001) argues that
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the difference between these interpretations is that the delusional interpretation is
culturally unacceptable whereas the panic interpretation is more culturally acceptable.
This study seeks to illustrate the extent to which these two groups are similar in terms
of their experience of physiological arousal and to determine what leads one group of
people to make one interpretation and the other group another interpretation. This has
implications for the further understanding and treatment ofdelusions.
1.2: History of Psychosis v's Neurosis
It is widely known that throughout the twentieth century, neuroses, which include
anxiety related disorders such as panic, have been categorised and classified very
differently from psychoses such as schizophrenia spectrum disorders. It is interesting
to note, however, that this was not always the case. In the late eighteenth century and
throughout the nineteenth century, psychosis was understood as a sub category of
neurosis, and the wider category of neuroses was understood as having a physical
cause (Beer, 1996).
William Cullen (1710-1790), a physiologist based at the University of Edinburgh
published a four volume textbook classifying all of the known mental diseases in
1777. Within this four volume textbook Cullen had used the term neurosis to describe
any disease or disorder characterised by abnormal nervous or mental function,
physically located within the nervous system (Neve, 2004), which included
'hypochondriasis or hypochondria affection commonly called vapours or low spirits'
(Cullen, 1808).
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However the meaning of neurosis changed during the 19th century to mean a fairly
mildly disordered mental state in which there was no loss of contact with reality but
instead various forms of defensive exaggeration present (Neve, 2004). Acute anxiety,
obsession, compulsion, and phobias were now classed as neuroses, with psychological
rather than organic causes (Neve, 2004).
According to Beer (1996), these views had spread by the turn of the twentieth
century. He stated that at this time most psychiatrists believed that psychoses had an
organic aetiology, whereas the neuroses were believed to be of psychological origin.
Jaspers (1963) also made a distinction between the neuroses and psychoses. He
suggested that neuroses were "meaningful and allowed empathy" whereas psychoses
were "ununderstandable" and "mad in the literal sense" (Freeman & Garety, 2003).
These views have remained until the present day but are now largely being questioned
once again, and although the classification system has separated these categories of
mental health difficulties, people have recognised that delusional beliefs may be
similar to non-delusional beliefs as far back as 1960 (Freeman, 2007).
1.3: Present Day Definitions
Presently, the term neurosis is rarely used in the diagnostic manuals that are frequently
used; 1CD-10 (World Health Organization (WHO), 1992) and DSM-IV (American
Psychiatric Association (APA), 1994). Conditions, including Panic disorder, which
were attributed to neuroses are now included in the group 'neurotic, stress-related and
somatoform disorders' in the ICD-10 and categorised as 'anxiety disorders' in DSM-
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IV. Psychosis is referred to under the category of 'psychotic disorders' in DSM-IV
and under the 'Schizophrenia, schizotypal and delusional disorders' group in ICD-10.
1.3.1: Defining schizophrenia and persecutory delusions
Psychosis is an umbrella term for the schizophrenic spectrum disorders which are
categorised within the diagnostic manuals. The present study involved recruiting
individuals who experience persecutory delusions and who, in some instances are
diagnosed with delusional disorder or a schizophrenia spectrum disorder, therefore
definitions of schizophrenia and persecutory delusions are explored below.
The essence of the DSM-IV (APA, 2000) description of diagnostic criteria for the
schizophrenic disorders is that there should be two or more of the listed characteristic
symptoms which include; delusions, hallucinations, disorganised speech, grossly
disorganised or catatonic behaviour, and negative symptoms. It is noted that only one
criterion need be present if delusions are bizarre. Further criteria specify duration,
social/occupational dysfunction, exclusion of schizoaffective and mood disorders,
exclusion of substance/general medical condition, and relationship to a persistent
developmental disorder. Similarly, the ICD-10 describes the schizophrenic disorders
as being 'characterised in general by fundamental and characteristic distortions of
thinking and perception, and affects that are inappropriate or blunted. Clear
consciousness and intellectual capacity are usually maintained although certain
cognitive deficits may evolve in the course of time' (WHO, 1992).
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Diagnostic criteria are arguably helpful when individuals present with particular
difficulties that directly match the descriptions used in the diagnostic manuals.
However, often individuals present with difficulties which do not neatly fit into these
diagnostic criteria. As a result, diagnoses are not given. In order that those people
who experience persecutory delusions or panic and who do not neatly fit the criteria
for each of the disorders are included within this study, a definition of panic and
persecutory delusions was also sought from the psychology literature.
Defining delusions has proved to be difficult within the literature because there is a
lack of consensus when defining delusions. Debates around defining a delusional
belief look for a difference between the content of normal beliefs and delusional
beliefs, and for what causes delusional beliefs. The difficulty is apparent because
delusions are not discrete discontinuous entities (Freeman, 2007), instead they are
complex, multi-dimensional phenomena (Garety & Hemsley, 1994).
Persecutory delusions are defined within the category of 'delusional disorder' of the
persecutory type in DSM-IV. This diagnosis is given if the patient believes that "The
patient (or a close associate) is in some way being intentionally cheated, drugged,
followed, slandered or otherwise mistreated." And that this occurs "For at least 1
month the patient has had delusions that are nonbizarre (the content is something that
could reasonably happen)." (APA, 2000). Persecutory delusions within the diagnosis
of delusional disorder differ from delusions that meet the diagnostic criteria for
schizophrenia in that they are not bizarre. The term bizarre is very subjective and is
likely to be interpreted differently among different researchers and mental health
professionals.
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Freeman and Garety (2000) outline a number of difficulties with definitions put
forward for persecutory delusions and offer clearer criteria (see Table 1.1) offering
more consistency for research in this area. However, they do not offer clarification of
how the term bizarre can be defined in relation to the content ofdelusions.
Table 1.1. Criteria for a delusion to be classified as persecutory (Freeman & Garety,
2000)
Criteria A and B must be met:
A. The individual believes that harm is occurring, or is going to occur, to him or her
B. The individual believes that the persecutor has the intention to cause harm
There are a number of points of clarification :
I Harm concerns any action that leads to the individual experiencing distress
II. Harm only to friends or relatives does not count as a persecutory belief, unless the
persecutor also intends this to have a negative effect upon the individual
Ill The individual must believe that the persecutor at present or in the future will attempt to
harm him or her
IV. Delusions of reference do not count within the category ofpersecutory beliefs
Freeman (2007) proposed that these criteria distinguish persecutory from anxious
thoughts. These criteria were used to recruit participants for the present study.
1.3.2: Defining Panic
Panic disorder is a category within the 'neurotic, stress-related and somatoform
disorders' group of the ICD-10 and is essentially described as "....recurrent attacks of
severe anxiety (panic), which are not restricted to any particular situation or set of
circumstances and are therefore unpredictable." (WHO, 1992). The DSM-IV divides
panic disorder into two categories which are 'panic disorder with agoraphobia' and
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'panic disorder without agoraphobia'. The definition used for the present study comes
from the DSM-IV definition of panic disorder without agoraphobia. This is described
as "recurrent unexpected panic attacks" and "at least one of the attacks has been
followed by 1 month (or more) of one (or more) of the following", which relates to
persistent "concern about having additional attacks, worry about the implications of
the attack or its consequences (e.g. losing control, having a heart attack, "going
crazy")' and/or 'a significant change in behaviour related to the attacks" (APA, 2000).
The essential feature of panic disorder is panic attacks which are defined as "A
discrete period of intense fear or discomfort, in which four (or more) symptoms which
include palpitations, sweating, shaking, shortness of breath, derealisation, a feeling of
choking, chest pain, dizziness, fear of dying, and paresthesias, which develop abruptly
and reach their peak within 10 minutes" (APA, 2000). The diagnosis of panic
disorder is reserved for a subset of individuals who experience recurrent panic attacks
(Clark, 1996). These criteria were used to recruit panic participants in the present
study.
1.4: Cognitive models of psychosis
Historically, psychosis has been understood as having an organic cause. More
recently, psychological theories have been implicated and developed to gain a deeper
understanding of the symptoms of psychosis. It is beyond the remit of this thesis to
describe all the psychological models of psychosis, and given that the focus is on
people's interpretations of their experiences, a brief summary of the most influential
cognitive models along with the stress vulnerability model is more appropriate and has
more relevance to the present study.
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1.4.1: Stress vulnerability model
Stress vulnerability models (e.g. Zubin & Spring, 1977; Nuechterlein & Dawson,
1984), sometimes referred to as diathesis stress models, have been widely used with
regards to psychosis and are a sign of the multidimensional nature of psychosis.
These models offer a biopsychosocial explanation for the development of psychotic
symptoms which can be helpful in clinical work when providing psychoeducation to
clients. Essentially, they assume that individuals have different levels of vulnerability
to psychosis which can be exacerbated by stress and lead to psychosis. The greater
the predisposition to schizophrenia, the less stress is needed for symptoms to emerge,
however if vulnerability is low, more stress is needed to trigger an episode (Figure
1.1). Vulnerability can be in the form of genetic factors, birth complications, or early
experiences (Freeman & Garety, 2004). Stress is defined as occurring as a result of
'the failure of routine methods for managing threats' (Gross, 1970), and may be in the
form of life events or high expressed emotion experienced in a person's environment.
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The stress vulnerability model gives context to the following cognitive models of
delusions that are of relevance to this study.
1.4.2: Delusions as normal theories
Maher (1988) describes delusions as normal theories. He suggested that cognitive
processes in delusional thinking do not differ from cognitive processes in non
delusional thinking. The delusions are thought of as theories which provide order and
meaning to explain surprising and puzzling experiences. When an explanation is
found it provides feelings of relief and a reduction in tension. Maher goes on to report
that theories will be judged by others as delusional when (a) they do not have access
to the information on which the delusion is based or (b) they have access to the
information but do not experience the same puzzlement as the person experiencing the
delusion.
For example, Maher (1988) describes case studies from autopsies of delusional
patients put forward by Southard at the beginning of the 20th century which suggest
that the apparent somatic delusions that the patients expressed when alive explained
the physiological phenomena that they were actually experiencing. One man who
was thought to have experienced persecutory delusions and was thought to be full of
hypochondriacal ideas such as "my stomach is full and I can't eat anything" was
found to have signs of intestinal obstruction and other signs warranting a tentative
diagnosis of abdominal cancer. This suggests that others did not have access to the
perceptual experiences that the gentleman had and therefore judged his statements
around being full as part ofhis delusional ideation.
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Table 1.2. Ten formal propositions of Maher's model
1 Delusional thinking is not, in itself, aberrant. This means that the cognitive processes whereby delusions are
formed differ in no important respect from those by which nondelusional beliefs are formed.
2 Delusions are best thought of as theories-much like scientific theories-that serve the purpose of providing order and
meaning for empirical data obtained by observation. The following propositions about delusions thus apply equally
well to the development of scientific theories.
3 The necessity for a theory arises whenever nature presents us with a puzzle. Puzzles arise when a familiar and
hence predictable sequence of observation fails to occur in the expected fashion, but occurs instead in a new and
unpredicted fashion. Puzzles are surprises. The events that are surprising are seen as significant
4 Puzzles demand explanation; the search for an explanation begins and continues until one is devised.
5 When an explanation for such a puzzle has been developed, it is accompanied by marked feelings of relief and
tension reduction, or even exhilaration. This occurs whenever the explanation appears to account satisfactorily for a
substantial range of the discrepant observations and for their departure from the predicted pattern.
6 Data obtained subsequently that contradict the explanation create cognitive dissonance and are unwelcome. Data
that are consistent with the explanation reduce dissonance and are given particular status in the explanation.
7 Theories will be judged delusional by others if (1) the data upon which they are based are not available to those who
are judging-thc Martha Mitchell Effect is an instance of a belief system being dismissed as pathological because
those who judged it to be delusional did not have personal access to the data upon which it is based; and (2) the data
are available but most observers do not experience puzzlement or sense the significance that the patient does. This
happens when events do occur as expected. The deluded patient nevertheless experiences puzzlement in the manner
suggested in paragraph 8 below.
The foregoing propositions may be summarised schematically as a sequence from observation to delusion, as
follows:
E. Expected sequence of experiences.
O. Observed sequence of experiences.
E matches O.
No discrepancy and nothing to be explained.
E differsfrom O.
Discrepancy is noticed-Experience of puzzlement or perception of significance arises-A search procedure is
activated, involving further observation-Development of hypotheses follows and these will be tested against new
observations-Rejection of hypothesis when new observation fails to confirm it-Renewal of search, and so forth, until
a satisfactory fit of observation to hypothesis is obtained-Feeling of relief-Reduction of dissonance-Raised
resistance to new contradictory data together with low threshold for recognition of confirmatory data.
8 The experiences of "significance" and "relief' are assumed to have a real locus in the central nervous system,
probably mediated by the matching of, or failure to match, one neutrally defined template (the expected sequence of
observations) with another neutrally defined template (the experienced sequence of observations). If the neural
locus hypothesis is correct, it is reasonable to suppose that the feeling of significance, with its accompanying tension
and activation of the search mode, may well be produced endogenously by various neuropathologies that affect the
relevant neural tissue, and that this may occur in the absence of any actual discrepancy in the environmental
sequences or between the neural templates themselves. Thus the observation of an expected, trivial, or irrelevant
event may be accompanied fortuitously by a feeling of significance and puzzlement even though the experienced
event may not be discrepant from its expected form. The concept of "delusional mood" fits this formulation (i.e.,
the experience that familiar objects or situations seem to have acquired an unexplained significance). When this
happens, the task of the patient is to discover why this seemingly trivial event or object is now significant.
9 Delusional theories based upon data unavailable to the public should develop whenever there is (1) a real
impairment in sensory functioning, including the sensation of pain, kinaesthetic and visceral sensations, and the like,
that has not been identified and diagnosed as such to the patient; (2) a defect in the processes that select incoming
information for processing (i.e., an attentional deficit); or (3) the experience of disturbance in personal expressive
behaviour, such as language disturbances or motor impairment, that have not been given an independent diagnosis.
0 A delusional theory, like other theories, is not readily abandoned until it can be replaced by a theory that better
explains the experiences that the patient is having. Hence the folk-clinical observation that delusional patients do
not readily abandon their theory in the face of critical contradictory evidence does not indicate a pathology of
reasoning. It merely tells us that deluded patients are like normal people-including scientists-who seem extremely
resistant to giving up their preferred theories even in the face of damningly negative evidence.
Taken from Maher (1988)
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Maher's model (Maher, 1974; 1988) has ten formal propositions (Table 1.2). However, a
basic version describing the practicalities of the model explains four main components to
a persecutory delusion: (1) the experience is the result of a disorder of perception due to
an impairment of function in sensory input pathways rather than a cognitive disability.
As a result of the impaired sensations, the sensory experience is unusual; (2) the
uniqueness of this unusual experience is noted and may lead to a belief that other people
are lying, which in turn leads to a feeling of being victimised and persecuted; (3) a
causative agent is identified where the sensations are painful or unpleasant. This
causative agent may or may not be visible. If no causative agent is visible, the patient is
left with the possibility of invisible agencies such as radio waves, demonic or devine
powers, FBI etc; (4) the patient attempts to understand why this is happening by drawing
on past experiences. Maher suggests that if the patient has a guilty secret in his past or
present life, he may conclude that this explains why he is now being punished in this way.
Maher's model may have been influential in prompting research into delusions within
healthy populations, and supports, as well as being influential in, the continuum
model. In addition, this model may also have played an influential role in Morrison's
(2001) misinterpretation model of psychosis. Maher (1988) provides a summary of
evidence that is consistent with his model which includes (a) the empirical
observations that delusions have been found in a number of different disorders (Maher
& Ross, 1984), and (b) that healthy participants can be provoked into experiencing
irrational beliefs under anomalous conditions like sensory deprivation. Maher also
states that there is no independent evidence of actual impairment of reasoning ability
in delusional patients. This argument was also put forward in a more recent paper by
Maher (2005).
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Garety and Hemsley (1994) provide a counter argument to Maher's claims. They
argue that although there may be some people who experience unusual sensory
experiences like an unacknowledged loss of auditory acuity, others who also
experience delusions may not, which therefore limits the generalisability of Maher's
model. In addition, they review literature which casts doubt on Maher's claim that
there is no evidence of actual impairment of reasoning ability in delusional patients.
In contrast to Maher's claim, Garety and Hemsley (1994) reviewed some experimental
studies of reasoning biases in people with psychosis. The review found that people
who experience delusions make excessively external attributions for negatively valued
events and positively valued events (Kaney & Bentall, 1989), and that the participants
showed a social reasoning bias in that they made excessive person attributions for
negative events and were over confident about their judgements (Bentall et al., 1991).
Since then there has been a number of studies that have found a jumping to
conclusions bias in persecutory delusions (e.g. Dudley et al., 1997). In contrast to
Morrison et al. (2001) and Maher (1974), Garety and Hemsley (1994) imply, in line
with the stress vulnerability model, that there is a biological component to the
development of delusional explanations. More specifically, they suggest that
delusions are the result of information processing deficits which occur as a result of
cognitive dysfunction, and these deficits can lead to anomalous experiences. This
model is supportive of the categorical model rather than the continuum model.
Maher's model led to clinicians and researchers asking questions about why the
delusional patient rejects the more natural explanation. Maher suggested that
delusional ideas spring from unusual internal experiences and therefore odd
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experiences lead to odd ideas (Freeman, 2007). Many different cognitive models have
also tried to answer this question by implicating different cognitive factors.
1.4.3: A cognitive misinterpretation model of psychosis
Morrison (1998) outlined a cognitive approach to auditory hallucinations that is based
on the models of panic and anxiety developed by Clark (1986), Beck (1976) and
Salkovskis (1991). He proposed that (a) 'hallucinations are normal phenomena, and
that it is the misinterpretation of such phenomena as threatening the physical or
psychological integrity of the individual that causes the distress and disability that are
commonly seen in schizophrenic patients experiencing hallucinations.' Morrison
states that evidence for this comes from research carried out by Allen and Argus
(1968) who suggested that hyperventilation can cause hallucinations to occur in
people who experience schizophrenia. And (b) 'the interpretations of auditory
hallucinations are maintained by safety seeking behaviours (including
hypervigilance)'. He suggests that the misinterpretations have an impact on negative
mood and physiological arousal which in turn trigger another hallucination, leading to
a vicious cycle similar to that found in panic. At the same time, the misinterpretation
brings about safety seeking behaviours, which in turn increases the probability of
another hallucination occurring and stops the individual from testing whether the
misinterpretation was true or not thereby maintaining the belief that the
misinterpretation is true. Morrison (2001) developed the model from being a generic
cognitive model based on anxiety disorders to one that takes into account
metacognitions and is applied to delusions as well as hallucinations (see figure 1.2).
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Figure 1.2 A cognitive model ofpsychosis
INTRUSIONS INTO AWARENESS
(Cognitive, body state, emotional or external
attention and thought control strategies)
Taken from Morrison (2001)
The cognitive model of psychosis developed by Morrison (2001) suggests that
delusions can be seen as interpretations of intrusions into awareness, and that it is the
interpretations of these intrusions that cause the associated distress and disability. It
also assumes that these interpretations are caused by faulty self and social knowledge,
which are in turn caused by past trauma. This model also argues that intrusions and
their interpretations are maintained by mood, physiology, and cognitive and
behavioural responses, which are guided by procedural beliefs such as 'scanning for
danger is a good survival strategy' and declarative beliefs such as 'people are
dangerous'.
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Metacognitive appraisals of delusions are also implicated in the development and
maintenance of psychosis. Morrison (2001) states that individuals who hold positive
beliefs about unusual experiences may take drugs to induce the experiences, or they
may attend more to unusual experiences, or the experiences may occur as a coping
response. However, he adds, if the unusual experiences are experienced in a negative
way, for example being appraised as uncontrollable or dangerous, or lead to
occupational or social functioning difficulties, they become distressing and
problematic.
Morrison (1998) also states that it is possible that negative appraisals around the
uncontrollability or danger of psychotic experiences are likely to invoke a perceived
threat to their physical or psychological well being. This is consistent with the Self-
Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model which suggests that vulnerability to
emotional disorder is majorly influenced and maintained by metacognitive appraisals.
In addition, Morrison's claims are supported by research showing that individuals who
experienced auditory hallucinations scored higher on the uncontrollability and danger
subscale of the metacognitions questionnaire (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997)
when compared with psychiatric and non psychiatric controls (Baker & Morrison,
1998). It should be acknowledged that Morrison's model is a fairly new model and
has not been fully empirically tested as yet.
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1.4.4: The threat anticipation cognitive model of persecutory delusions
Freeman et al (2002) developed a multifactorial model of persecutory delusions (see
figure 1.3). They suggest that many of the processes implicated in the maintenance of
anxiety disorders (Clark, 1999) should be implicated in the maintenance of
persecutory delusions. It is proposed that both persecutory delusions and worry are
similar in that they both involve anticipation of danger and have physical, social or
psychological threat content (Wells, 1994; Freeman & Garety, 2000). For this reason
anxiety is hypothesised to be the key emotion in the formation of persecutory
delusions.
Figure 1.3 A schematic presentation of Freeman et al. (2002) cognitive model of the






















Taken from Freeman et al. (2002)
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Figure 1.4. A schematic presentation of Freeman et al. (2002) cognitive model of the






























Taken from Freeman et al. (2002)
Freeman et a/.'s (2002) model is based on previous work done by Freeman and
colleagues and the work of Maher, Birchwood, Chadwick, and Bentall (Freeman et al.
2002). According to Freeman et al. (2002), in individuals who are predisposed to
psychosis, a delusion will be formed by a stressor (e.g. life event) which may cause
arousal, which in turn will induce an inner-outer confusion (Fowler, 2000), which in
turn will cause an anomalous experience (e.g. misinterpreting thoughts as voices) of
which an explanation will be sought. This explanation will depend on things like
beliefs, emotions, metacognitions, cognitive flexibility and cognitive biases.
Maintenance of a persecutory belief occurs when confirmatory evidence of their belief
is obtained (e.g. by seeking out evidence for their belief), and evidence against their
beliefs (disconfirmatory evidence) is discarded (e.g. through safety behaviours such as
avoidance). Emotions and negative beliefs about the self, others and the world are also
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implicated in this model and serve to maintain the delusion. Further appraisals such as
beliefs about illness (metacognitive beliefs) will also have an impact on emotions and
serve to maintain the delusion. All of this occurs against a background of previous
experiences and knowledge (see figure 1.4).
Freeman (2007) reviewed the psychology of persecutory delusions. He notes that
there is an association of paranoia with lowered self-esteem and depression, although
different levels of self-esteem can be found amongst individuals experiencing
paranoia, and low self-esteem and depression could be one of many vulnerability
factors for paranoia. He concludes that there is considerable evidence of affect and
related processes having a direct, nondefensive role in the development of paranoid
thoughts and that anxiety may be especially important in paranoid thoughts.
However, models have not yet, been fully empirically tested and Freeman (2007)
recognises this suggesting that further research could involve testing whether
psychological models of paranoia can be shown to have high accuracy in explaining
the occurrence ofpersecutory thoughts.
1.4.5: Delusions as a result of reasoning biases
Reasoning biases such as reduced data gathering ('jumping to conclusions') (Garety
& Freeman, 1999), a failure to generate or consider alternative explanations of
experiences (Freeman et al. 2004), and a strong confirmatory reasoning bias
(Freeman, Garety, Kuipers and McGuire, 2005) are implicated in the maintenance of a
persecutory delusion (Freeman, 2007) and are integrated into Freeman's threat
anticipation cognitive model ofpersecutory delusions.
Wendy Prentice 24 D. Clin. Psychol
Research around the 'jumping to conclusions bias' has been carried out by Phillippa
Garety and colleagues since the 1980's. They found evidence to suggest that people
who experience delusions are quicker to jump to conclusions than healthy or non-
deluded psychiatric controls (Garety & Hemsley, 1994). They report that individuals
experiencing delusions make decisions based on less information than healthy controls
and therefore show hasty decision making. Furthermore, they suggest that this hasty
decision making is what leads to the development of delusional explanations.
However, it has been stated that only 40-70 per cent of these individuals show
evidence of this hasty decision making (Freeman & Garety, 2004), which suggests
that reasoning biases on their own cannot account solely for persecutory delusions.
This illustrates the complexity of persecutory delusions and the need for a
multifactorial model. In addition, Fraser, Morrison and Wells (2006) found no
differences between their panic and their delusions groups on a jumping to
conclusions bias task.
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Taken from Kuipers et al. (2006)
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This model of the positive symptoms of psychosis (see figure 1.5) was put forward by
Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman and Bebbington (2001). They suggest that
appraisal of unusual experiences plays a central role in the development of positive
psychotic symptoms. They also suggest that emotional changes and low self-esteem
are very important and cognitive dysfunction such as information processing deficits
are emphasised in the development of positive symptoms of psychosis. Furthermore,
they suggest that reasoning biases play a role in symptom formation and maintenance
(Kuipers et al. 2006). This model differs from Morrison's and Freeman's models in
that cognitive dysfunction (e.g. information processing deficits) is seen to be a factor
that distinguishes between psychosis and other disorders such as anxiety or depression
in this one but not in Morrison's. These multifactorial models differ mainly in the
emphasis of different model components.
1.4.6: Delusions as a result ofdysfunctional attributional style
This cognitive theory implicates cognitive dysfunction and draws on research
implicating a dysfunctional attributional style (Bentall, 1994; Bentall & Kinderman,
1998, 1999; Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994).
The delusion as defence model of persecutory delusions has been given a lot of
thought within the literature and suggests that people who experience persecutory
delusions externalise negative attributions to guard against low self-esteem. However,
this has been challenged by others (Garety and Freeman, 1999) because studies have
found that a number of individuals experiencing delusions exhibit low self-esteem as
measured by self-esteem questionnaires. They argue that if externalising negative
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attributions protects against low self-esteem then people would not experience low
self-esteem and would instead experience normal to high levels of self-esteem. In
response, Bentall et al. (2001) report that self-esteem does not necessarily need to be
high in the delusion as defence model, and recognises that there are inconsistencies in
the research literature which may be due to how it is measured due to the fact that self-
esteem in individuals who experience persecutory delusions may fluctuate.
Richard Bentall and colleagues are proponents of the delusion as defence model.
They assume that people experiencing persecutory delusions have negative beliefs
about the self that are vulnerable to activation by negative life events. This is
consistent with the stress vulnerability model. In addition they assume that those
experiencing persecutory delusions try to avoid activating negative beliefs about the
self by attributing threatening events to the actions of another person (Bentall et al
2001). It seems that in contrast to Freeman et aVs theory which suggests that
persecutory delusions are the direct result of emotional concerns, Bentall's model
suggests that persecutory delusions are a result of a tendency to avoid negative
emotions.
1.4.7: Delusions as a result of a theory ofmind deficit
One further cognitive theory which has suggested cognitive dysfunction and has
received a lot of attention in the literature, implicates a theory of mind deficit (Frith,
1992; 1994). Testing this model is outwith the boundaries of the present study,
however, it has received a lot of attention within the literature and so warrants a
mention here. It has been proposed that certain psychotic symptoms associated with
schizophrenia reflect a deficit in the ability to appreciate other people's mental states
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(beliefs, desires, feelings and intentions) (Frith, 1992). According to Frith's theory,
persecutory delusions occur when the person experiencing the delusions is unable to
determine what other's beliefs and intentions are and they assume that others are
purposefully hiding their intentions, which leads them to believe that a conspiracy
exists.
One problem that has been highlighted with this theory is that although it gives a good
explanation of how individuals experiencing delusions come to their conclusion that a
conspiracy exists, it does not describe why the explanation is delusional in nature. For
example, it is possible that people can experience a situation where others' perceived
mental states are considered as being purposefully hidden but will not necessarily
conclude there is a conspiracy. Secondly, there are people who experience theory of
mind deficits, but they do not develop persecutory beliefs.
Some studies have shown that theory of mind difficulties do occur in people who
experience persecutory beliefs (e.g. Craig et al. 2004), however other studies have
found that theory of mind deficits are not present (e.g. Walston et al. 2000). Other
findings have suggested that theory of mind is strongly related to thought disorder,
verbal memory and cognitive disorganisation rather than "paranoia" (Greig et al.
2004). This suggests that theory of mind is not a necessary factor in persecutory
delusions and cannot account for the processes that result in the delusional
explanation. Therefore a theory of mind deficit theory of persecutory delusions is not
sufficient within itself to explain the occurrence ofpersecutory delusions.
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1.5: Continuum versus Category debate
Cognitive models hypothesise that symptoms of psychosis lie on a continuum from
subclinical to clinical and that the presence of psychotic experiences alone is not
sufficient to be considered as symptomatic of psychosis (Garety, 2007). The
continuum approach suggests that delusions are not qualitatively different from
normal beliefs, but simply represent a more extreme end of the population spectrum or
distribution of anomalous mental phenomena (Johns & Van Os, 2001; Van Os, 2003).
The alternative to the continuum model is the categorical approach which makes a
clear distinction between presence and absence of mental disorder and argues that a
distinctive mechanism is responsible for the formation and fixation of delusions
(Jaspers, 1963 cited in Van Os, 2003).
Freeman (2007) recognises the argument that delusions might be better understood on
a continuum with normal experience and refers to his previous research which
reviewed 15 studies and concluded that there is a high rate of delusional beliefs in the
general population. They found that around 1-3 per cent of the general (nonclinical)
population experience delusions similar in severity to clinical cases of psychosis, and
that another 5-6 per cent experience less severe levels but were related with social and
emotional difficulties. A further 10-15 per cent were said to experience regular
delusional ideation.
Another study found that there was a lot ofoverlap in the range of scores on the Peters
delusions inventory (PDI) from both healthy and delusional groups (Peters et al. 1999)
which is consistent with the continuum model. These researchers also found that the
participants in the delusions group had significantly higher scores on the three
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dimensions within the PDI which measures distress, preoccupation and conviction.
They concluded that it is not simply the presence of a delusion that is problematic but
the strength of the interpretation of the delusion, its emotional impact and how much
people think about it which leads to the inability to function to full capacity. This
illustrates the multidimensional nature of delusional beliefs as well as providing
support for the continuum model ofpsychosis.
According to Van Os (1999) there are two continuum views which apply to psychosis.
One suggests that psychotic states are on a continuum with normality and reflect
dimensions of normal personality variation. The second refers to psychotic symptoms
being on a normal continuum which increases in severity from healthy to affective
states such as anxiety and depression through to clinical psychosis. Both suggest that
psychosis is on a continuum with normal experience. One piece of research of which
the results promote the argument for the continuum model found that mean scores of
delusion proneness as measured by the PDI were lowest amongst the healthy control
group, highest amongst the clinical psychosis group, and the second clinical group,
which consisted of people experiencing anxiety and depression, produced mean scores
that fell between the other two groups (Van Os et al. 1999).
The categorical model of psychosis assumes that the presence of a delusional belief
equates to being unwell. There are a number of difficulties with this view. Firstly, it
is widely acknowledged that simply the presence of what may be classed as delusional
beliefs is not enough to cause clinical symptoms, and this is evidenced by research
carried out within healthy populations (e.g. Kendler et al. 1996; Van Os et al. 2000;
Johns et al. 2001). In addition, people can experience culturally acceptable beliefs
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which may also be arguably classed as delusional, for example religious beliefs
(Peters et al. 1999). This does not equate to being unwell as the category debate
suggests. However, in support of the category debate, significant differences are
generally found in studies comparing clinical populations with healthy populations.
Secondly, the level of distress, conviction and preoccupation associated with
delusional beliefs have been implicated as changing along the normal continuum from
mild to severe (e.g. Appelbaum et al. 1999; Peters et al. 1999) rather than being
present or not present as is suggested with the categorical approach. In addition,
research has found that neuroticism may precede, and contribute to the onset of
psychosis (Weiser et al. 2001; Krabbendam et al. 2002; Freeman & Garety, 2003).
Thirdly, previous research has found that there is a high rate of delusional beliefs
within the general healthy population (Peters et al. 1999, 2004; Freeman et al. 2005)
who are not accessing services. All of this evidence lends support to the continuum
rather than the categorical model of psychosis.
In summary, some cognitive models of psychosis, such as Morrison's and Maher's
models, are based on the assumption that psychosis is on a normal continuum, which
supports the continuum model. However, others, such as Garety et al. (2001), suggest
that there is a biological basis to psychosis which supports the categorical model.
Some components which are implicated as being important for the development and
maintenance of psychosis by the cognitive models are interpretations/explanations,
emotion, self-esteem, metacognitions, and safety behaviours. To date, these different
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aspects that are said to be involved in the development and maintenance of delusions
have been studied in relative isolation. The current study seeks to explore a variety of
these indices together, within the context of a continuum model. This study seeks to
do this by measuring the responses of healthy controls, panic disordered patients and
people who experience delusions to standardised measures of those variables
implicated in the development and maintenance of delusions. These variables include
misinterpretations of body state information, metacognitions, experiential avoidance
(as a safety behaviour), emotionality, and self-esteem. Research evidence for the
inclusion of each element is reviewed below.
1.6: Evidence ofMisinterpretations
1.6.1: Delusions
According to Morrison (2001) delusions are misinterpretations of intrusions into
awareness which cause the associated distress and disability. It has been suggested
that the nature of intrusions are of three different kinds; external stimulus information,
cognitive state information, and body state information (Wells and Matthews, 1994).
The initial interpretation of the intrusion will determine choice of cognitive and
behavioural responses or strategies that will affect the subsequent occurrence of
similar intrusions. For example if someone interprets a delusion as a result of stress or
sleep deprivation, they may reduce arousal or get some sleep but not give the delusion
any further thought. However if the same person was to interpret it as being a sign of
madness or indicative of someone's attempts to harm them, they may engage in
hypervigilance for similar experiences, attempt to suppress the experience, punish
themselves for it or adopt safety behaviours to prevent the feared outcome, all of
which may contribute to the maintenance of further delusions.
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Maher (1974) noted that delusional beliefs are considered as explanations of
experience, and that internal feelings (e.g. physiological arousal) as well as external
events (e.g. others' behaviour), are the kinds of experiences that cause delusional
explanations. In addition, Freeman (2007), states that persecutory delusions are
viewed as explanations that contain threat beliefs about physical, social or
psychological harm. He gives an example saying that people who are vulnerable to
paranoid thinking try to make sense of internal unusual experiences by interpreting
external information in an unhelpful way. For example, a person may go outside
feeling unusual and rather than accept that this is the case, they interpret the feeling as
evidence, together with the facial expressions of strangers in the street, that there is a
threat.
Misinterpretations of intrusions regarding bodily sensations are central to the
cognitive model of panic (Clark, 1986) as well as other anxiety disorders such as
obsessive compulsive disorder (e.g. Salkovskis, Forrester, Richards & Morrison,
1998; Wells, 1995), generalised anxiety disorder (Wells, 1995),and hypochondria
(Warwick and Salkovskis, 1990).
Morrison suggests that many delusions arise from misinterpretations of bodily
sensations. An epidemiological example is available that develops the analogy with
regards to misinterpretations that Morrison (1998) made between auditory
hallucinations and panic disorder. Williams (2002) describes the treatment of a young
woman with a diagnosis of schizophrenia and uses the cognitive model of panic
disorder (Clark, 1986; see figure 1.6) as a template when understanding her psychotic
experiences, therefore cognitive therapy was the treatment of choice.
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The young woman described experiencing pulses akin to throbbing in her body which
she thought were being sent to harm or kill her by her husband and/or others. After a
brainstorming session a possible list of explanations were made including
physiological symptoms of anxiety and each explanation was ruled out based on
information and evidence gained. Through evidence gathering and guided discovery
the young woman was able to interpret the pulsing in a more culturally acceptable and
less distressing way by attributing the pulsing to anxiety related physical symptoms
and to physical changes in her body as a result ofher pregnancy.
Safety behaviours which helped her to avoid thinking about the pulsing were
identified and replaced with strategies concerned with thinking about the normality of
the pulsing. By the twelfth session a reduction in the frequency of the pulsing
phenomena, the duration of the phenomena when it did occur, and the degree of
distress experienced was reported. Williams (2002) clearly states that he is in no way
suggesting that this is a good model for psychosis in general but rather that it may be
helpful when formulating with individuals within a sub group of people who
misinterpret the physiological sensations associated with anxiety in a delusional and
catastrophic manner. He also makes a distinction between the sub group mentioned
above and individuals who misinterpret such sensations catastrophically in socially
acceptable ways and are understood to suffer from panic disorder.
There are some further epidemiological examples in the literature of people who
experience psychosis and misinterpret bodily sensations. For example, Reeves &
Torres (2003) present seven cases in which patients experiencing psychosis
misinterpreted physical pain and expressed this pain as a delusion. In one case, a 42
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year old man diagnosed with schizophrenia misinterpreted pain he experienced down
his leg which was caused by a slipped disc. He attributed the cause of the pain as
devils stabbing him with knives so that they could enter his body through the wounds.
His condition was very painful and required removal of the spinal disc, however, his
treatment was delayed because his description of the pain was seen as a delusion. In
another case example a 47 year old man diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia began
refusing to attend his outpatient appointments and refill his prescriptions because he
was growing vampire teeth and could not go outside during the daytime, or he would
be destroyed. An oral examination revealed that he had lost all of his central upper
teeth, which made the incisors on either side of his mouth more noticeable. The
authors concluded that 'psychotic patients may perceive or misinterpret stimuli related
to physical symptoms incorrectly. They may fail to communicate these symptoms
properly to others, and their complaints may sound bizarre or delusional.'
All of these examples suggest that at least some people who experience psychosis
misinterpret internal bodily sensations, therefore, it makes sense to measure the
interpretations of bodily sensations between both groups as a measurement of
attributions for the present study.
1.6.2: Panic
The literature proposes that the common theme that occurs among panic attacks is the
misinterpretation of the bodily sensations. According to Clark's theory of Panic
(figure 1.6), individuals who experience recurrent panic attacks have a relatively
enduring tendency to interpret certain bodily sensations in a catastrophic fashion. The
misinterpreted sensations are basically those involved in normal anxiety responses
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(e.g., palpitations, breathlessness, dizziness, paresthesias). The catastrophic
misinterpretations involve perceiving these sensations as much more dangerous than
they really are, and, in particular, interpreting the sensations as indicative of an
immediately impending physical or mental disaster. Whereas people who do not
experience panic are more likely to interpret their physical sensations as being the
result of 'normal' experiences rather than evidence that something bad is going to
happen.









Taken from Clark (1989)
With reference to Morrison's (2001) explanation of how delusional interpretations are
processed, we can see that Morrison's cognitive model of delusions is an expanded
version ofClark's model ofpanic.
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1.6.3: Attribution Theory
Presently, attribution theory in persecutory delusions suggests that individuals
attribute the cause of negative events to external factors to defend themselves from
threats to their self-esteem, especially when combined with internal attributions for
positive events (self serving bias (SSB)). The self serving bias has also been found
within healthy populations and it is believed that within delusional populations this
bias is exaggerated. The self serving bias is said to preserve self-esteem by reducing
the difference between their idealised view of self and their actualised view of self
(Bentall, Kinderman & Kaney, 1994; Bentall el al. 2001). The attributional theory for
persecutory delusions is still not widely accepted as a definitive explanation for the
maintenance or cause of paranoid like thinking (Humphreys and Barrowclough,
2006). Explanations for why this is the case have been proposed and suggest that
there may be difficulties with the self serving bias theory itself or with the way in
which it is assessed (Garety and Freeman, 1999).
The research which has been carried out has measured attributions using the
Attributional Style Questionnaire (ASQ; Peterson et al. 1982) and the Internal,
Personal, and Situational Attributions questionnaire (IPSAQ; Kinderman and Bentall,
1996). The ASQ was criticised for its reliabiltiy so Kinderman and Bentall (1996)
developed the IPSAQ. Both questionnaires use hypothetical events and there is some
doubt over whether hypothetical events serve as an equal to real events (Martin &
Penn, 2002).
As previously mentioned, the present study used a measure from the health
psychology literature (Symptoms Inventory Questionnaire (SIQ); Robbins and
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Kirmayer, 1991) which gives examples of common physical symptoms (e.g.
headaches, dizziness, dry mouth, sweating) and offers three different interpretations
for each. The three different attributional styles are characterised by a psychological,
physical, or environmental cause. This measure is fairly realistic in that everyone
experiences common physical symptoms such as headaches and therefore can be used
on all three groups (Panic, delusions, and healthy control group). The measure was
also adapted to take into account the possibility that individuals who experience
persecutory type thoughts may attribute the common physical symptom to something
other than the three attributional styles offered.
1.7: Metacognition
Metacognition has been identified as being an important factor which has been
implicated in anxiety disorders (Wells, 2000) and psychosis (Morrison, 2001). It is
described as "...any knowledge or cognitive processes that is involved in the appraisal,
monitoring or control of cognition" (Wells, 2000).
1.7.1: The SelfRegulatory Executive Function (S-REF) Model
Meta cognitive beliefs are said to be an important factor contributing to the Self-
Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) within the S-REF model of emotional
disorders proposed by Wells & Matthews (1994; 1996). The S-REF model was
developed in an attempt to overcome issues linked to schema theory and link schema
theory with information processing and self regulation (Wells, 2000). Wells describes
the S-REF model as being based on three interacting levels of cognition (see figure
1.7): (1) a stimulus driven lower level network of processing units which function
outside conscious awareness but can impact on conscious processing in the form of an
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intrusion; (2) a level of controlled processing which is involved in the conscious
appraisal of events and the control of action and thought; (3) a store of self knowledge
(beliefs) in long term memory. These beliefs have a metacognitive component and
consist partly of plans for processing.






















Low Level Processing Units
Taken from Wells (2000)
Wells (2000) notes that metacognition, attention, the regulation of processing and
dynamic aspects of processing have been overlooked in schema theory and cognitive
therapy and this model has been developed to illustrate the mutual causal relations
between all of the components. Metacognitive models have been put forward for a
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number of anxiety based disorders such as Generalised anxiety disorder (GAD) and
Obsessive Compulsive disorder (OCD). In these metacognitive models, which are
grounded in the S-REF model, metacognitions are triggered, and they then impact
directly on emotions and behaviour. A coping strategy is implemented which in turn
reinforces the self knowledge (which is often a metacognition) that lead to the
selection of the coping strategy. Metacognitive beliefs are linked to the interpretation,
selection and execution of particular thought processes, attention strategies and
behaviours.
There are two modes of S-REF processing: (1) object mode and (2) metacognitive
mode. Within the object mode the underlying assumption is that appraisals and
beliefs are accurate and thoughts must be acted on. The goal then is to eliminate
threat. Strategies are then put in place to evaluate the threat and implement threat
reducing behaviours (e.g. worry, threat monitoring). According to Wells, (2000) the
probable result from processing in object mode will be that maladaptive knowledge is
strengthened. In metacognitive mode thoughts are appraised as events rather than
reality, and these thoughts must be evaluated. The goal is to modify thinking by
evaluating thoughts and also executing metacognitive control behaviours (e.g. suspend
worry, redirect attention). The probable outcome for this mode of processing will be
the restructuring of self knowledge and new plans developed. Wells (2000) concludes
that the S-REF model predicts that metacognitive knowledge, appraisals' and
strategies are a key influence on the vulnerability to and maintenance of emotional
disorder.
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1.7.2: Metacognition in anxiety and psychosis
As already noted, metacognitions are implicated in Morrison's cognitive model of
psychosis which draws from the S-REF model. Morrison (2001) suggests that
positive beliefs about psychotic experiences are associated with hallucinations and
delusions, and that negative beliefs about psychotic experiences are associated with
distress. Studies have consistently found that metacognitive beliefs about psychotic
experiences play a role in their development and maintenance (Baker & Morrison,
1998; Lobban, Haddock, Kinderman, & Wells, 2002; Morrison & Wells, 2003).
However, this research has mainly focussed on hallucinations rather than persecutory
delusions. More recently, one study found that beliefs about paranoia as a strategy for
managing interpersonal threat were associated with frequency of paranoid thoughts,
and negative beliefs about paranoia were associated with distress (Morrison et al.
2005). However, replication of these relationships will not be attempted in the present
study as it is beyond the boundaries of the present research.
Fraser, Morrison and Wells (2006) found no significant differences between their
panic and delusion groups on their metacognition scores as measured by the
metacognitions questionnaire (MCQ). In addition, Morrison and Wells (2003)
compared the metacognitive beliefs of patients with delusions and patients with panic.
They found that the groups scores were often similar and elevated in comparison to
non patients.
Wendy Prentice 41 D. Clin. Psychol
1.8: Experiential Avoidance
Experiential avoidance is described as occurring when a person is unwilling to
experience private experiences such as bodily sensations, emotions, thoughts,
memories, images, and behavioural predispositions. In addition it happens when a
person actively changes these experiences by reducing the amount of times they
experience it or particular aspects of it (Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, & Strosahl,
1996).
Experiential avoidance is a term used within the Acceptance and Commitment
Therapy (ACT) literature, and it appears similar as a construct to other terms widely
used within the literature such as avoidance, cognitive avoidance, experiential control
and emotional avoidance. A wide range of therapies acknowledge that avoidance is a
problem and can play a part in the maintenance of a wide range of psychological
disorders. Avoidance is often used as a safety behaviour strategy as discussed
previously. Individuals who avoid an aversive experience, put themselves in a
position where they are unable to test whether the event is aversive or not and this is
often referred to as a failure to disconfirm. If there is a failure to disconftrm then the
behaviour is maintained and the avoidance behaviour can become problematic. A
general example of this is if a person is bitten by a dog and they become aversed to
dogs and therefore avoid them, they never meet other dogs and therefore do not
disconfirm their belief that all dogs are dangerous. The avoidance behaviour can
generalise to not going to parks or refraining from going outside at all because the
neighbour has a dog. The avoidance maintains the belief and the behaviour becomes
problematic.
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Hayes et al. (2004) reasons that avoidance can be harmful because private events are
often unresponsive to deliberate control efforts (see Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000 for a
review of thought suppression). Experiential avoidance has been noted within
different therapies such as psychoanalysis, client centred therapy, and gestalt therapy
(Hayes, 2004) for a long time and has recently received more attention through
proponents ofACT.
Experiential avoidance has not been studied in psychotic samples but the evidence of
association between experiential avoidance and psychopathology is sufficient in other
disorders that it is worth studying here. Hayes and colleagues (2004) point out that
avoidance can paradoxically increase the likelihood of unwanted private events, and
conclude that excessive experiential avoidance is likely to be associated with higher
levels of psychopathology and a lower quality of life. This is evidenced by research
which has been carried out.
One study (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1995) tested the etfects of ruminative worry on a
group of non-clinical participants who were assigned to five groups; (a) control group;
(b) Imagery group; (c) Distraction group; (d) Usual-worry group; and (e) film worry
group). The participants were asked to rate their anxiety levels before they saw a
gruesome short film and again after they had watched the film. Frequency of verbal
worries and images during the film, and the amount of film watched were also
measured after the film by the participants. Each group were then exposed to a short
time where they were asked to either (a) image about the film and its implications, (b)
engage in a distraction task, (c) worry about things that usually cause them to worry,
(d) settle down, (e) worry about the film and its implications in verbal form.
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Participants were then asked to record the frequency of intrusive thoughts over the
next 3 days. The investigators found that verbal worry increased the number of
intrusive images experienced by participants in this group. Evidence for these effects
in clinical populations also exist (e.g. Craske et al. 1990).
Examples of strategies that ensure experiential avoidance include thought suppression,
emotional suppression, avoidance coping, reappraisal, and self deception (see Chawla,
2007 for a review). Avoidance is thought to possibly bring about the negative
symptoms of schizophrenia (Freeman et al. 2001), and a literature search for
avoidance and delusions identified only one study which directly measured avoidance
in delusions. Within this study, avoidance was found to be the most popular type of
safety behaviour used by individuals experiencing persecutory delusions (Freeman et
al. 2001).
Thought suppression, another type of avoidance, is said to be applied to private
experiences with high social disapproval in a psychotic population (Bach and Hayes,
2002). This suggests that individuals experiencing delusions as well as other forms of
psychosis are likely to use this method of coping. Individuals experiencing auditory
hallucinations reported using distracting activities such as listening to music,
behavioural tasks such as taking exercise, and cognitive tasks such as ignoring as
ways of suppressing symptoms (Shergill et al. 1998).
Acceptance is the opposite of avoidance, and is mentioned in person centred based
cognitive therapy (PCBCT; Chadwick, 2006) as well as being a central theme in ACT.
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Chadwick (2006) offers a narrative to illustrate the experience of acceptance from a
client's perspective within the context ofmindfulness.
You don't have to worry about what's right or wrong in your head, you know,
it's that not judging what's going through your head, it's just accepting it as
what it is, not worried about vindictive voices, or whatever, it's just accepting
it, that's the way it is. No right, no wrong....Whereas before, this kind of stuff
was happening I was fighting against it, thinking "no, this is wrong, this is
wrong", fighting against these images, (p.89)
Another narrative offered by Chadwick (2006) illustrates the difficulty that an
individual had in accepting thoughts because they invoked a strong judgement like
'I'm a bad person, sick in the mind.', and these judgements were supported by
metacognitive beliefs such as 'I should not have these experiences, only a sick person
would have thoughts like these.' (pp 89.) This suggests that acceptance and
improving insight into metacognitive beliefs may be helpful strategies to employ when
recovering from psychoses, as opposed to avoidance based coping/safety strategies.
Research has been carried out on acceptance versus thought suppression in individuals
who experience panic. One study involved a group of participants who experienced
panic disorder with or without agoraphobia (Levitt et al., 2004). The participants
were assigned to three groups: (1) acceptance group where individuals listened to a
narrative which described the benefits of being willing to experience their thoughts
and feelings; (2) suppression group where individuals listened to a tape encouraging
them to gain control over their thoughts and feelings by pushing negative thoughts and
emotions away; and (3) no instruction control group where individuals listened to a
national geographic tape. Physical symptoms were then induced using C02 gas and
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anxiety levels and avoidance was measured. They found that the acceptance group
reported less subjective anxiety and less avoidance (more willingness to participate in
a second challenge) than did participants in the suppression or control groups. In
addition, there were no significant differences between the three groups on self-report
panic symptoms or physiological arousal, and there were no significant differences
between suppression and control groups on subjective anxiety or willingness to
participate in a second challenge. These findings suggest that by using an acceptance
rationale individuals are more likely to show less avoidance, and reduced levels of
subjective anxiety, which impacts favourably on behaviour.
Morrison (2001) suggests that many of the clinical developments pioneered in the
field of anxiety disorders could be applied to psychosis. He goes on to say that
identification and manipulation of safety behaviours, generation of alternative
explanations for difficulties encountered and developing an alternative explanation in
collaboration with the client for their difficulties through a cognitive formulation
would be helpful in engaging the client and inform choice of intervention.
1.9: Emotionality
Previously, research into emotions and psychosis has been a neglected area. However
Freeman and Garety (2003) put forward the simple argument that if emotional
disturbance is present then it may influence psychosis, suggesting that further research in
this area is needed.
Emotion is a central theme for models of delusions (Freeman et al. 2002; Bentall et
al. 2001), and plays a part in the formation and maintenance of delusions in
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Morrison's (2001) model. The S-REF model also implies that emotional processing
occurs at both the lower and upper levels. Research into emotions and delusions has
mainly focussed on anxiety, depression and self-esteem to date. However, individuals
tend to experience a multitude of emotions which are not limited to these three areas.
The application of emotions in models of psychosis suggests that there is an increasing
awareness that emotion is an important component in psychosis, as well as in the
neuroses.
Emotional disturbances such as anxiety, depression and irritability are said to occur, in
the majority of cases, in the prodromal period (two to four weeks) before positive
symptoms of psychosis such as hallucinations and delusions are experienced (Freeman
& Garety, 2003). Anxiety and depression have also been found to occur along with
positive symptoms of psychosis (Birchwood, Iqbal, Chadwick, & Trower, 2000;
Turnbull & Bebbington, 2001). Anger is another emotion which has been implicated in
psychosis (Cullari, 1994), however, another study found no raised levels of anger in a
group of individuals who experienced persecutory delusions (Freeman et al. 2001).
Garety et al. 2005 conducted a study to see whether the contributions of reasoning and
emotional processes to delusional severity are independent or act in combination.
They used the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI) and the Beck Depression Inventory
(BDI) to measure anxiety and depression in individuals who experienced mainly
persecutory delusions. They found that anxiety, but not depression showed a clear
contribution to severity of delusional conviction as measured by the Psychotic
Symptoms Rating Scale (PSYRATS; Haddock et al. 1999).
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Freeman and Garety (2003), in their review, suggest that emotions other than anxiety
and depression may have a central role in the formation and maintenance of particular
types of delusions defined by their content. The emotions identified were disgust,
jealousy, guilt, and shame. The BES includes disgust, guilt and shame in its measurement
of emotional experience.
The Basic Emotions Scale (BES) was developed to allow a measure of emotionality
for five basic emotions: Fear, sadness, happiness, disgust and anger. It has not been
used with individuals experiencing persecutory delusions, however it has recently
been used to measure emotionality in individuals who had experienced psychoses as
well as individuals who had experienced anxiety, and healthy controls (Livingstone et
al. 2008). This study found that both clinical groups experienced similar levels of
emotionality in comparison to healthy volunteers with the clinical groups experiencing
greater scores on negative emotions such as sadness, fear and disgust. The clinical
groups reported experiencing happiness less often than the healthy control group.
Emotion has been implicated in the formation and maintenance of psychosis (e.g.
Freeman et al. (2002); Morrison, 2001; Garety et al. 2001) and therefore has clinical
implications for therapeutic work with people who experience psychosis. Research
on emotion regulation and psychosis has been neglected which is possibly down the
the historical separation between the neuroses and psychoses (Livingstone et al.
2008).
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1.10: Self Esteem
Freeman (2007) talks about the relationship between paranoia and emotion. He and
colleagues put forward the view that persecutory delusions are a direct reflection of
emotional concerns. They argue that there are two distinct forms of paranoia; 1. Poor
Me Paranoia which is a defense and 2. Bad Me Paranoia which is a direct reflection of
extreme negative emotion. Freeman et al. (2001) state that if delusions are a defense,
then self-esteem should be normal but if paranoia builds on negative views of the self
then self-esteem should be low. Freeman (2007) refers to Bentall (2001) who argued
after looking at the self-esteem data that there are very mixed findings concerning
levels of self-esteem in paranoia with some having preserved self-esteem and others
having low levels of self-esteem. They explain this by saying that there is instability
in self-esteem in people with paranoia, and that these individuals are locked into a
struggle to defend against negative emotion, sometimes winning and sometimes
losing.
The studies carried out in non clinical populations around paranoia and self-esteem
found that paranoia is repeatedly found to correlate with lower self-esteem. In
addition Drake et al. (2004) found that in a study of nearly 200 first episode clients,
paranoia was related to lower SE at a number of points in time over 18 ms.
Furthermore, Drake et al.'s study is one ofmany in the literature implicating affective
problems with the positive symptoms of psychosis and providing evidence that low
SE and anxiety predict the development of delusions and hallucinations
(Krabbendaum et al. 2002). Again, the clinical implications of this warrant further
investigation to allow for evidence based best practice.
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1.11: Rationale for the present study
The literature reviewed has shown that there is growing evidence for the similarities
between anxiety related disorders and Psychosis. Morrison's (2001) model of
psychosis is based on Clark's (1986) panic model and there is some evidence to
suggest similarities between the disorders in the processing of information. However,
what is still unknown is why one group interprets their experiences in a catastrophic
but culturally acceptable way and the other interprets their experiences in a
persecutory and culturally unacceptable way. This study aims to explore possible
constructs which may indicate why these differences between the groups'
interpretations occur.
The multidimensional nature of psychosis has been illustrated by the models
proposed, and therefore a number of the constructs indicated in this review will be
measured. This study aims firstly to determine similarities and differences in the
interpretations of physiological symptoms made by panic and delusion clinical groups
compared with a group of individuals who have no previous history of mental health
problems. Secondly, this study aims to explore similarities in other areas that have
been implicated in persecutory delusions and panic, such as emotion, metacognitions,
experiential avoidance, and self-esteem. Significant differences are expected between
the clinical and the control groups on all measures and similarities are expected
between the clinical groups in most areas.
The present study is exploratory and by no means seeks to have a direct answer to the
question of the differences between the interpretations of the two groups, however, it
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does seek to begin to explore possible constructs which may indicate an area of further
exploration. It is unlikely that any one factor will cause the difference in
interpretations as psychosis is a complex phenomenon, however, if there are
differences between the clinical groups in one area, it may be worth further
exploration.
1.12. Research question and hypotheses
The primary research question of this study is:
Why do groups who experience the same sensations interpret them differently, and
what factors might explain these differences?
The research hypotheses are:
1. There will be similar levels of anxiety in the clinical groups compared to the
control group.
2. Clinical groups will differ in their interpretations of somatic symptoms.
3. Any further factors that differ between the clinical groups that might help
explain any differences in their interpretations of common somatic symptoms
will be explored.
4. There will be significant differences between the clinical groups and the
healthy control group on all measures.
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Chapter 2: Methodology
2.1. Measures and rationale for their selection
Self report questionnaires were used so that quantitative scores could be obtained and
compared between groups. The Symptom Interpretation Questionnaire (SIQ) was
taken from the Health Psychology literature to determine whether there are differences
in the attributions made for somatic symptoms between the groups. Metacognitive
beliefs were measured using the Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ-30). Levels of
self-esteem were measured by using the Self Concept Questionnaire (SCQ).
Emotionality was measured by using the Basic Emotions Scale (BES). Levels of
experiential avoidance were measured using the Acceptance and Action Questionnaire
(AAQ-2). In addition, levels of anxiety and levels of delusional ideation were also
assessed using the State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI) and the Peter's Delusions
Inventory (PDI) respectively.
The internal reliability of each measure is reported. Internal reliability is often found
using Cronbach's alpha (a). This measures how well the items within the
questionnaire are measuring the same construct. The higher the alpha, the more likely
each item is internally consistent with the others and is therefore measuring the same
underlying construct. Usually a reliability coefficient of .70 or higher is considered as
being acceptable (Clark-Carter, 1997).
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2.1.1: The Symptom Interpretation Questionnaire (SIQ)
The SIQ (Robbins & Kirmayer, 1991) is a widely used 39 item self report
questionnaire which was developed to measure attributional style in medical patients.
It consists of thirteen common physical symptoms (e.g. headache) which are presented
in a statement (e.g. If I had a prolonged headache, I would probably think it is
because) and is followed by three possible attribution styles 1) somatising attributional
style (There is something wrong with my muscles, nerves or brain), (2)
psychologising attributional style (I am emotionally upset), or (3) as a normalising
attributional style (A loud noise or bright light or something else has irritated me).
Participants rate the extent to which they would attribute each possible cause to the
somatic symptom on a four point scale (A to D), and each point has a value judgement
attached (A=Not at all; B= Somewhat; C=Quite a bit; D= A great deal). The SIQ also
records the occurrence of 13 common somatic symptoms by asking the participant
whether they have experienced the symptom in the last three months. The scale was
adapted so that any external attributions could also be rated.
The SIQ was developed to measure attributions for common somatic symptoms. The
researchers found that there are three types of attributions made with these symptoms:
(1) psychological; (2) normalising; and (3) physical. Attribution theory is a major
influence on the development of this questionnaire and is concerned with how
individuals interpret events and how this relates to their thinking and behaviour
(Weiner, 1986). Attribution theory is used to understand and explain why people
behave the way they do. Measuring symptom attributions informs research in the area
of health, however as far as I am aware it has not been used to compare attributional
styles amongst individuals experiencing psychosis and individuals who experience
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panic. Robbins & Kinnayer (1991) believe that symptom attributional style may
contribute to the somatisation and psychologisation of distress that are often
encountered in primary care. Measuring attributional style of common somatic
symptoms in a psychiatric population may lead to future studies on the relationship
between attributional styles and distress in psychiatric populations. Furthermore, the
scale has been found to possess adequate internal reliability (Robbins & Kirmayer,
1991) (Table 2.1).





The SIQ was adapted to include 'other' as a further option to allow participants to
include any external attributions or internal attributions other than the existing
somatic, psychological and normalising causes offered. It was chosen to measure
interpretations in the present study because it is a widely used questionnaire with good
internal reliability, and it has been used with clinical groups as well as non-clinical
groups in the past (e.g. Ritsner, 2003 & Wise and Mann, 1995). In addition it is
grounded in attribution theory and it allows for the measurement and comparison
between interpretations of common physiological sensations in all three groups.
Morrison (2001) proposes that people with psychosis as well as people with panic
disorder interpret internal experiences (thoughts, emotions, body state information) in
a similar way. The SIQ will potentially help to identify in what way they these groups
are similar and how these clinical groups differ from a healthy control group.
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2.1.2: Basic Emotions Scale (BES)
The Basic Emotions Scale (BES) (Power, 2006) is a self report questionnaire which
measures emotionality. It assesses how often people experience 20 different emotions
'during the last week' and 'in general' using a 7 point Likert scale (from l=not at all
to 7=all of the time), and how well they felt they coped with that emotion (from
l=cope very well to 7=cope very badly). There are 5 basic emotions (Anxiety, Anger,
Sadness, Disgust, and Happiness) which alternate between the 20 items and this
facilitates a total score of between 4 and 28 for each basic emotion and for coping
ability. Total scores for trait and state emotionality can range between 20 and 140.
The theory behind the development of the BES comes from models of discrete basic
emotions as opposed to the positive-negative affect models of emotion. Basic emotion
theorists argue that there are a limited number of 'basic' emotions from which more
complex emotions are derived (Power, 2006). The 'basic' aspect of these emotions
are said to relate to a range of features including being innate, being universal across
cultures, and appearing early in child development (Power, 2006). There seems to be
no universal agreement amongst theorists about how many basic emotions exist,
however the five basic emotions that are measured in BES tend to appear on almost all
lists (Power, 2006). The internal reliability was good for all five subscales of the BES
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Anxiety, depression, and anger are emotions which have been implicated in psychosis,
and emotions are also implicated in models of psychosis signifying their importance in
the development and maintenance of psychosis. Therefore emotionality was a
variable of interest within this research. The BES was chosen, firstly, because it is a
valid and reliable measure (see table 2.2), secondly, because it is an economical way
ofmeasuring state and trait emotionality as well as coping ability in one measure, and
because it is easily understandable for participants.
2.1.3: Metacognitions Questionnaire (MCQ-30)
The Metacognitions questionnaire - 30 (MCQ-30: Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004)
is a shortened version of the original MCQ which contained 65 items. It was
developed to measure dimensions of metacognitive beliefs, cognitive confidence
judgements and selective attention to mental events (cognitive self-consciousness)
(Wells, 2001). The theory behind the development of the MCQ was the Self-
Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model (Wells, 2000; Wells & Matthews,
1994, 1996) which suggests that metacognition is an important factor in the
development and maintenance of psychological disorder (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton,
2004).
The number of items in the original MCQ was shortened to 30 items in the MCQ-30
to reduce the participant response burden and has good internal consistency (see Table
2.3), and a factor structure that is consistent with that of the original scale. The five
subscales are : (1) Positive beliefs about worry, (2) Negative beliefs about thoughts
concerning uncontro liability and danger, (3) Cognitive confidence (assessing
confidence in attention and memory), (4) Negative beliefs concerning the
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consequences of not controlling thoughts and (5) Cognitive self-consciousness (the
tendency to focus attention on thought processes) (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004).
Each of the five subscales are represented by six items each which are interwoven
throughout the questionnaire. Each item is evaluated on a four point scale (l=Do not
agree; 2=Agree slightly; 3=Agree moderately; 4=Agree very much. Higher scores on
the overall score of metacognitions and on the five subscales suggest higher levels of
dysfunctional metacognitions and higher vulnerability to worry. Scores can range
between 30 and 120.
Table 2.3 Internal reliability ofMCQ-30 subscales
Subscale N a
Cognitive confidence 182 .93
Positive beliefs 182 .92
Cognitive self-consciousness 182 .92
Uncontrollability and danger 182 .91
Need to control thoughts 182 .72
The MCQ-30 was used in the present study because it is a reliable instrument which
measures metacognitions and is more economical than the original MCQ. An
exploratory factor analysis was carried out to determine construct validity between the
MCQ and the MCQ-30. Four of the five factors were the same subscales used in the
original MCQ. For these factors the factor structure replicated those of the original
MCQ. The fifth factor ('beliefs about the need to control thoughts') three out of the 6
items loaded highly, two modestly, and one showed a weak loading (Wells &
Cartwright Hatton (2004).
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Metacognitions were measured because they are said to influence appraisals and
beliefs (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004), therefore it is possible that specific aspects
of these cognitions may be related to the kinds of interpretations that are made. In
addition, the present study was influenced by Morrison's cognitive model of psychosis
which draws on the S-REF model, and metacognitive appraisals of the delusions are
strongly implicated in the development and maintenance of psychosis (Morrison,
2001). The MCQ-30 was used to measure metacognitions because it shows strong
internal reliability and it is more economical for participants to fill out. As a number
ofmeasures are being used in this study, reduction in response burden for participants
is important.
2.1.4: SelfConcept Questionnaire (SCO)
The SCQ (Robson, 1989) is a 30 item questionnaire which was developed for use in
clinical research. It consists of 30 items that are based on 7 components of self-
esteem, according to theoretical and empirical information reviewed by Robson
(1988). The seven components include: (1) subjective sense of significance, (2)
worthiness, (3) appearance and social acceptability, (4) Competence, (5) resilience and
determination, (6) Control over personal destiny, and (7) the value of existence. Items
are scored on an 8 point Likert scale with four anchor points ranging from
(Incompletely disagree to 1- completely agree, giving a maximum score for 'global'
self-esteem of 210. Higher scores indicate higher levels of self-esteem. (Robson,
1989). The SCQ has proven to have good overall reliability (Cronbach's a of .89)
with good convergent construct validity1 (control=correlation of 0.804 (p< 0.0001);
' Construct convergent validity was tested against Rosenberg's (1965) widely used measure of self-
esteem. High construct validity indicates good assessment of a construct - in this case self-esteem.
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anxiety group= correlation of 0.85 (p<0.0001)) and clinical validity2 (the correlation
between the clinician's estimate and the SCQ was 0.85 (p<0.0001); Robson, 1989).
Self-esteem was measured because attributional style affects self-esteem (Abramson,
1978). The SCQ was used to measure self-esteem in the present study because it is
easily understandable, can be completed in just a few minutes, and has good reliability
and validity for measuring global self-esteem. In addition, this measure has been used
with clinical groups and non clinical groups in the past (e.g. Hall and Tarrier, 2003;
Robson, 1989) with no reported problems.
2.1.5: Acceptance and Action Questionnaire (AAQ-II)
The AAQ (Bond et al. 2004) is a general measure of experiential
avoidance/psychological flexibility. Experiential avoidance is the phenomenon that
occurs when a person is unwilling to remain in contact with particular private
experiences (e.g. bodily sensations, emotions, thoughts, memories, images,
behavioural dispositions) and takes steps to alter the form or frequency of these
experiences or the contexts that occasion them, even when these forms of avoidance
cause behavioural harm (Hayes et al. 2004; 1996). One account of experiential
avoidance is provided by Acceptance and Commitment Therapy (ACT) and its
underlying theory of language and cognition, Relational Frame Theory (RFT) (Hayes
et al. 2004).
2 Clinical validity was assessed by means of nine experienced clinicians who estimated the self-esteem
of patients well known to them on a ten point visual analogue scale and then asked the patients to
complete the SCQ (Robson, 1989).
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The AAQ-II (Bond, 2008 personal communication) is a brief self report measure
containing 10 items which are rated on a 7 point Likert scale from l=Never true to
7=Always true, giving a maximum score of 70. Higher scores on the AAQ-II reflect
greater experiential avoidance, while lower scores reflect greater acceptance and
action.
It was developed to address the reliability problems encountered by the AAQ-I in
some populations. The reliability of the AAQ-II is reported to be consistently good
with a mean alpha coefficient across seven samples of .83 (ranging from .76 - .87),
and a three and 12 month test-retest reliability of .80 and .78, respectively. In addition
to its good reliability, findings indicate that the AAQ-II is associated with variables to
which it is theoretically tied, and it is not associated with variables to which it is
theoretically unconnected (Bond, 2008 in communications).
The AAQ-II was chosen as a measure of experiential avoidance because of its good
reliability and validity and because it is a brief measure thereby reducing the response
burden of participants. In addition it is easy to read and understand.
2.1.6: State Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI)
The STAI (Spielberger et al. 1983) is a well validated measure of anxiety symptoms.
Therefore it is seen to be the standard anxiety measure used in research. It is a self
evaluation questionnaire which measures state and trait anxiety. State anxiety is
measured by asking the participant how they feel right now in relation to the 20
statements that follow. Trait anxiety is measured by asking the participants how they
feel generally in relation to another 20 statements that follow. Each statement (e.g. I
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feel calm) is rated by the participant on a four point scale from 1 to 4 with each point
holding a value judgement (l=almost never; 2=sometimes; 3=often; 4=almost
always). The participant indicates which value judgement best describes how they
feel. Overall scores can be directly interpreted as: higher scores meaning higher levels
of anxiety on their respective scales and lower scores mean low levels of anxiety.




The STAI was chosen to measure anxiety in the present study because it shows good
internal reliability (see table 2.4) and is a widely used and validated measure of state
and trait anxiety. Anxiety was measured as it has been implicated in both panic and
psychosis. In addition, it was important to measure anxiety levels to ensure that both
groups were experiencing anxiety so that the SIQ was measuring experiences that
were similar amongst the clinical groups.
2.1.7: Peters Delusions Inventory (PDI)
The PDI (Peters et al. 2004) is a twenty one item self report questionnaire measuring
delusional ideation in the general population as well as in a clinical population. The
twenty one item measure is a shortened version of the original forty item measure
which, along with the forty item measure, shows good internal reliability (n= 385;
a=.82) and validity. Participants answer yes or no to each of the 21 items (e.g. Do
you ever feel as if people are reading your mind?) and if the answer is no they go
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straight on to the next item. However, if the answer to an item is yes, the participant is
asked to rate the extent to which the beliefs are (1) Distressing (Distress), (2) How
often they think about them (Preoccupation), and (3) How much they believe them to
be true (Conviction) on a 5 point scale from 1 (Not at all distressing; Hardly ever think
about it; Don't believe it's true) to 5 (Very distressing; Think about it all the time;
Believe it's absolutely true). Each subscale (distress, conviction and preoccupation)
incurs possible scores of between 0 and 105. In addition, every 'Yes' answer
accumulates another point incurring scores of between 0 and 21. Therefore, Yes/No
scores in addition to each subscale score gives an overall score of between 0 and 336
with higher scores representing higher levels of delusional ideation.
The PDI-21 was used in the present study because it has good internal reliability as
evidenced by the alpha coefficient, it measures delusional ideation in clinical and non
clinical populations, and it is a shorter version of the previous 40 item measure,
thereby reducing response burden.
2.2: Study Design
A quantitative methodology was adopted, and within this, a between subjects
experimental design with three levels of the independent variable and five separate
dependant variables (see figure 2.1) was deemed as most appropriate to answer the
research questions. The independent variable (IV) - 'Group' has 3 levels: 1.
Persecutory delusions group, 2. Panic group, 3.Control group. The dependent
variables (DV's) are: 1. Interpretations of somatic symptoms, 2. Emotionality, 3.
Metacognitions, 4. SelfEsteem and 5. Experiential avoidance.
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Figure 2.1. Experimental Design.
Questionnaires
(DV's)
Interpretations SIQ (Appendix 1 a (v))
Emotionality EES (Appendix la (i))
Metacognitions ^ MCQ-30 (Appendix la(iv))
kSelf Esteem L> SCQ (Appendix la (iii))
Experiential
Avoidance AAQ-I1 (Appendix la (ii))
2.3: Procedures
2.3.1: Preparation
All of the questionnaires, except the STAI and the PDI, were formatted to look similar
(See Appendix 1). They were retyped using Microsoft word and the format for each
questionnaire was similar to the AAQ-II. The questions remained exactly the same as
they appeared in the original questionnaires but the presentation was changed so that
they were consistent. The presentation of questionnaires changed in the way that the
first item on each questionnaire was given a lightly shaded background alternating
with the next question having no shading and so on. All of these questionnaires were
stapled together in the same order (see table 2.5). The STAI and PDI were presented
as separate questionnaires but given at the same time as the amalgamated
questionnaire.
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2.3.2: Participants
All participants were adults between the ages of 18 and 65 who volunteered to
participate in the study. There were 42 participants in total, consisting of 26 females
and 16 males, average age 39.0 years (range 18-61). Participants in the clinical
groups were composed of inpatients and outpatients within Lanarkshire adult mental
health services, and participants in the healthy control group were people who worked
and/or lived in Lanarkshire or surrounding areas.
2.3.3: Recruitment
Participants were recruited using opportunistic sampling. A clinician information
sheet (Appendix 2) was distributed to clinicians who agreed to help with recruitment.
This information sheet included details of the inclusion and exclusion criteria for the
study (see table 2.5). Participants who met the inclusion criteria for the clinical
groups were approached by staff who were involved in their care (Psychiatric nurses;
Psychiatrists, Clinical and Counselling Psychologists, Clinical Associates and
Occupational therapists), and asked if they wanted to participate in the research. If
they said they would like to take part or that they would think about it, they were
given a consent form and a summary information sheet (see Appendix 3) which
included the contact details of the researcher, research supervisor's and course co¬
ordinator to enable them to express any concerns or queries. Alternatively, clinicians,
with their client's permission, would directly give the researcher the client's details
and the researcher would contact the potential participant to arrange a time to meet. In
these cases, the participant would receive an information sheet and sign a consent
form on meeting with the researcher. Otherwise, participants were required to send
their signed consent form with their details to the researcher in a stamped addressed
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envelope who, in turn, contacted them to arrange a suitable time to meet. Meetings
took place either at the clinic where they saw their psychologist or at their home, if
requested and appropriate. In all cases, clinician's were asked to advise clients to
wait at least 24 hours to think about whether they would like to participate or not
before they gave their consent.
Table 2.6: Inclusion/Exclusion criteria
Inclusion criteria:
• Delusions group: Adults between the ages of 18-65 currently experiencing persecutory
delusions, and who have a diagnosis of delusional disorder or schizophrenic spectrum
disorder based on DSM-IV criteria.
• Panic group: Adults between the ages of 18-65 who meet DSM-IV criteria for Panic
disorder.
Exclusion criteria:
• Delusions group: Organic or drug induced basis for the delusions.
• Panic group: The presence of delusions, or a first-degree relative with a diagnosis of
schizophrenia.
• Both groups: Severe substance abuse. If participants are abusing substances, their
answers will not reflect clearly their mental health state.
Recruitment for the control group involved approaching people working within
Monklands General Hospital, in jobs which were not medical or mental health related
positions. Some friends and family of these workers also volunteered.
Completed participant questionnaires were assigned to groups depending on the
participants experiences. Individuals who experienced persecutory delusions were
assigned to the 'persecutory delusions' group, people who experienced panic were
assigned to the 'Panic' group, and individuals who had never been through the mental
health system before were assigned to the 'Control' group.
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2.3.4: Meeting with participants
A standard procedure was followed when meeting with participants. On meeting the
investigator, participants were briefed on what taking part in the research would entail.
They were told that the questionnaire takes about one hour to complete. For each
participant, the researcher then went over instructions of the more complicated
questionnaires (SIQ and the PDI-21) and answered any queries. The participants were
also told that they could opt out of participating at any time. Participants were then
given privacy to fill in the questionnaires in a closed room by themselves unless they
specifically requested the researcher stay. The questionnaires were presented in the
same order for each participant (see table 2.6). Participants were also given
instructions of how to get in touch with the researcher if they needed to. Otherwise
the researcher checked to see how they were getting on after half an hour, and would
reappear after another fifteen minutes to half an hour depending what stage the
participant was at in the questionnaire.
Once finished, the participants were debriefed and were given the opportunity to ask
questions about the study or express feelings or thoughts they may have experienced
while filling in the questionnaire. It is worth noting that the questionnaires did not
tend to trigger any unpleasant thoughts or feelings while being completed by the
participants. Finally, the questionnaires were sealed in a plain brown A4 envelope in
the presence of the participant and each participant was thanked for their participation.
In addition, all procedures and documentation used conformed to COREC guidelines.
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1 State Trait Anxiety Inventory
2 Peters et al. Delusions Inventory
3 Basic Emotions Scale
4 Acceptance and Action Questionnaire - II
5 SelfConcept Questionnaire
6. Metacognition Questionnaire - 30
7. Symptom Interpretation Questionnaire
2.3.5: Data Analyses
Statistical analyses were performed using SPSS for Windows Version 11 and
Graphpad Instat Version 3. Exploratory data analyses were carried out to explore the
data's distribution. The data did not appear to be normally distributed therefore tests
of normal distribution and variance were carried out. Non-parametric tests were used
on the data which did not pass these tests and parametric tests were carried out on
those that did. Analyses of variance's (ANOVA's) were used to determine whether
the groups differed significantly and planned post hoc comparisons were performed to
determine the significance of the differences between all groups.
2.4: Ethics
A number of ethical issues were taken into consideration during the planning of this
study. It was deemed important that participants did not feel pressured into
participating so they were always advised to take 24 hours to think about it before
consenting to participate in the study. Participants were always given the option of
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opting out of the study. None of the participants could be classed as adults with
incapacity because organic causes for the difficulties experienced were part of the
exclusion criteria. This is acknowledged because this study was assessed by a special
'adults with incapacity' ethics board (the ethics team who assessed the ethical validity
of the study agreed that it should have gone through the normal channels - see
Appendix 4). Stamped addressed envelopes were provided for outpatients to send in
their consent form and contact details.
Participants were given the opportunity to discuss any issues that questions may have
brought up for them after they had filled in the questionnaire. Participants were given
contact details of the researcher, the researcher's supervisors' and the programme
director of the clinical psychology doctorate course so that they could voice any
concerns they had about how the research was conducted. Participant records were
not accessed if the researcher was not already working with them as requested by the
ethics board. All information collected from the participants was treated anonymously
and was kept securely in a locked cabinet at all times with the exception of when data
was input into a statistical database. Data was stored on an NHS computer rather than
a home computer as requested by the ethics committee.
The study proposal was reviewed by Scotland A Research Ethics Committee and the
members of the committee gave a favourable written ethical opinion of the study on
28th May 2007 for implementation in Lanarkshire. The study was also passed at that
time by the local research and development department in Lanarkshire.
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2.5: Power Calculation
Cohen's statistical tables were consulted to calculate power. Cohen (1992) suggests
that 21 people should be included in each of the three groups with a large effect size
for One-way Analyses of Variance (ANOVA). A large effect size was expected
between the non-clinical and clinical groups. Based on these calculations 21
participants were required for each group making a total of at least 63 participants
required for the present study.
Difficulties during the recruitment phase meant that these numbers could not be
reached which meant that power was reduced. However, previous research comparing
the same three groups of participants (people with persecutory delusions, people with
panic disorder, and non-patient controls) and using similar questionnaires, recruited
15 participants for each group (Fraser et al. 2006) which gives power of 0.64 and a
medium effect size of 0.5.
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Chapter 3: Results
3.1. Exploratory analyses
Exploratory data analyses were carried out to assess whether the assumptions of
normal distribution and homogeneity of variance of parametric tests were met before
using them on the data. Unequal sample sizes were also taken into account.
Histograms and stem and leaf plots showed that some data may not be normally
distributed, and box plots highlighted a few outliers in the data. For this reason a
Kolmogorov-Smimov (KS) test was used to determine normal distribution, and
Bartlett's test was used to test for equal variances amongst groups. Results of these
tests can be found in Appendix 5.
Non parametric tests (Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and
Dunn's multiple comparison test) were used on the data that did not pass the normality
and variance tests. The Kruskal-Wallis test was chosen as it is the non parametric
equivalent of the one way ANOVA allowing multiple comparisons to be made when
the assumptions of a one way ANOVA are not met. Dunn's multiple comparison post
hoc test is a non-parametric test used to determine significant differences between
multiple groups following a significant finding on a Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA test.
Parametric tests (one way analysis of variance (ANOVA) and post hoc Tukey-
Kramer) were preferred on the data which meet the parametric assumptions as they are
more powerful tests than the non parametric ones. The Tukey-Kramer test was
selected over all other multiple comparison tests because it is powerful, it has good
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control over type I errors, and it takes into account unequal sample sizes when
calculating significant differences between groups.
3.2. Sample characteristics
The overall mean age for the participants in this study was 39.0 years (range=l 8-61
yrs). A one-way ANOVA revealed no significant difference in age between the 3
groups, F(2,38) = 0.631, p > 0.05. There are observable differences between the
numbers of males and females in each group (see Table 3.1). Analyses could not be
reliably done on the data to determine whether there was a significant difference in
gender between the 3 groups as the numbers in the panic group were too small.
In addition, there may be an impact of unknown variables such as educational level,
types of medication taken, diagnoses, and duration of untreated psychosis. However,
this information was not obtained.
Table 3.1. Descriptive statistics for age and gender of sample
Characteristic Group
Delusion (N=T6) Panic (N=ll) Healthy
Volunteers (N=15)
Gender (M/F) 10/6 2/9 4/11
Mean Age (SD) 38.40(11.66) 37.18 (9.20) 42.00(11.52)
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3.3. Hypotheses testing
3.3.1. Hypothesis 1: There will be similar levels of anxiety in the clinical groups
compared to the control group.
3.3.1.1, Anxiety levels amongst groups
Exploratory data revealed 2 outliers in the state anxiety data (1 low score within the
panic group and the other a high score in the healthy control group). One outlier was
also found in the trait anxiety data representing a high score within the healthy control
group. For this reason, non-parametric tests were used.
Descriptive statistics (see figure 3.1) show, in line with the hypothesis, that there is
very little difference between the clinical groups on levels of state and trait anxiety.
The panic group's median scores are slightly higher than the delusion group scores on
state and trait anxiety and both clinical groups scored much higher than the healthy
control groups for both measures of anxiety.
A one way Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed significant
2differences between the three groups for both state and trait anxiety (state: x (2) =
23.353, p < .0001; trait: x2(2) = 22.649, p < .0001).
Wendy Prentice 72 D. Clin. Psychol
Figure 3.1. Levels of state and trait anxiety amongst groups
Delusions Gp Panic Gp Healthy Gp
Group
Dunn's multiple post hoc comparisons of the three groups indicate that there were no
significant differences between the clinical groups, and as expected, the healthy
control group scored significantly lower than the clinical groups on state and trait
anxiety (State: Delusion vs Healthy Control mean rank difference^ 6.7, p<0.001;
Panic vs Healthy Control mean rank difference=20.836, p<0.001; Trait: Delusion vs
Healthy Control mean rank difference=l 4.931, p<0.01; Panic vs Healthy Control
mean rank difference=21.328, p<0.001).
3.3.1.2. Summary of findings with regards to hypothesis 1
Hypothesis one is supported because there were no significant differences between the
clinical groups on scores of state and trait anxiety, however, the differences between
the clinical groups and the healthy control group were significant.
Wendy Prentice 73 D. Clin. Psychol
3.3.2 Hypothesis 2: Clinical groups will differ in their interpretations of somatic
symptoms.
3.3.2.1 Interpretations of somatic symptoms amongst groups
All interpretations passed the homogeneity of variance test and the normality test.
However, exploratory data analysis found one high outlier in the delusion group's
somatising scores therefore median values were given for somatic interpretations.
Descriptive statistics (see figure 3.2) showed that the clinical groups gave more weight
to psychological interpretations as being the cause of somatic symptoms than the
healthy control group, and that the healthy control group gave more weight to normal
attributions than the clinical groups. Interestingly, the panic group had slightly higher
mean scores for psychological causal attributions than the delusion group, and the
delusion group scored slightly higher than the panic group on somatic interpretations,
although these differences were not significant.
A one way ANOVA revealed significant differences between the three groups for the
weight given to psychological interpretations (F(2,38) = 21.078, p < .0001).
However, the differences in scores between groups for somatising and normalising
interpretations were not significant (F(2,38) =1.647ns; F(2,38) =2.580 ns
respectively).
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A Tukey-Kramer multiple comparison test showed that there was a significant
difference between the clinical groups and the healthy control group (delusion vs.
healthy control q=6.028, p<0.001; panic vs. healthy control q=8.923, p<0.001) on the
weight given to psychological interpretations of common somatic symptoms with an
overall alpha level of .05. The results also indicated that there were no significant
differences between groups' attributions of somatic symptoms to a normal or somatic
cause with an overall alpha level of 0.05.
No significant differences were found between the clinical groups on the weight given
to all three possible causes attributed to somatic symptoms. However the difference
between the clinical groups was approaching significance (p=O.056) when attributing
psychological causes to somatic symptoms. Participants who experienced panic were
Wendy Prentice 75 D. Clin. Psychol
more likely to attribute somatic symptoms to psychological causes than those in the
delusion group.
3.3.2.1.1 Number of somatic symptoms experienced amongst groups
Descriptive statistics of the number of physical symptoms experienced in the last 3
months shows that the clinical groups experienced more somatic symptoms over the
past three months than the healthy control group (see table 3.2).
Table 3.2. Summary of number of physical symptoms experienced over the past three
months between groups.
Groups (N) Median Minimum Maximum
Delusion (16) 8.5 1 13
Panic (11) 12 8 13
Healthy Control (15) 3 0 8
A Kruskal-Wallis one way analysis of variance revealed that the number of somatic
symptoms that participants had experienced in the last three months were significantly
different between groups (% (2) = 23.190, p < .0001). A Dunn's post hoc multiple
comparison test revealed that there was a significant difference between the healthy
control group and the clinical groups (DELUSION VS HEALTHY CONTROL mean
rank difference=l3.954, p<0.01; PANIC VS HEALTHY CONTROL mean rank
difference=22.721, p<0.001) with the clinical groups experiencing more somatic
symptoms in the past three months than the healthy control group. There were no
significant differences between the two clinical groups.
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3.3.2.2 'Other1 Interpretations of somatic symptoms amongst groups
Some participants offered 'other' interpretations (see Appendix 6 for the actual
comments made). The interpretations offered were divided into the three main
categories in line with the questionnaire: Normalising, somatic and psychological
attributions, (see table 3.3 for descriptive statistics). There were no delusional
interpretations of somatic symptoms offered by individuals from the delusions group.
Two interpretations were ambiguous and one did not offer a causal attribution (see
Table 3.3).
















Delusion (9/56%) 22 6 5 2/1 36
Panic (5/45%) 13 2 9 0 24
Healthy control
(3/20%)
2 2 2 0 6
As can be seen from table 3.3, participants in the delusions group offered more
alternative interpretations than those in the panic group or the healthy control group,
the majority of which were normal attributions of somatic symptoms. No statistical
analysis was carried out on this data because the number of participants in each group
who offered 'other' interpretations was too small to get an accurate picture ofwhether
there were any significant differences between groups.
Wendy Prentice 77 D. Clin. Psychol
3.3.2.2.1 Delusions Group: Themes of'Other' Interpretations of somatic symptoms
Themes within the 'normal' interpretations were mainly attributing somatic symptoms
to exercise or lack of it, lack of sleep, and side effects of medication. Psychological
interpretations included themes of mainly stress, fear and rumination. Themes of a
more somatic nature included existing physical conditions and medication side effects
as well as possible physical conditions. There were also more ambiguous
interpretations. For example, in response to the statement 'If I was sweating a lot, 1
would think it is because:' a participant wrote: "Maybe outside forces". This could be
attributed to weather conditions or something more bizarre-like, however not enough
information was gathered to clarify this answer. Another response to a different
statement was also ambiguous. The statement was 'If I got dizzy all of a sudden, I
would probably think it is because:' and the participant wrote "Maybe I'm just weak".
This could be in the context of physical or psychological weakness. In addition, a
further response to a statement did not offer any interpretation of the somatic
symptom. The statement was 'If I had a prolonged headache, I would probably think
that it is because:' and the participant wrote "As I have a sore head".
3.3.2.2.2 Panic Group: Themes of'Other' Interpretations of somatic symptoms
Themes within the normal interpretations of somatic experiences were mainly
attributed to medication side effects and lack of sleep. Themes of a psychological
nature included anxiety and panic. Themes attributing somatic symptoms to physical
causes included existing, as well as possible, physical illness. No ambiguous
responses were offered.
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3.3.2.2.3 Healthy Control Group: Themes of 'Other' Interpretations of somatic
symptoms
This group offered the lowest number of 'other' interpretations. 'Normal' responses
included lack of sleep and "Not enough choice of food" in the context of a cause for
losing their appetite. More psychological responses included "Baby on the way, tests
to come" in the context of being unable to sleep, which suggests worry about test
results, and "Tension-bad posture". Responses of a somatic nature as a cause of
somatic symptoms included "Viral infection symptom" and "Hormonal problems".
No ambiguous responses were given and there were also no responses which lacked in
causal attributions.
3.3.2.3 Summary of findings with regards to Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 proposed that the clinical groups would differ in their interpretations of
somatic symptoms. There were no significant differences between the clinical groups
with regards to all three causal attributions. However, the difference between the
panic and delusions group was approaching significance when the somatic symptoms
were thought to have a psychological cause, with the panic group attributing more
weight to psychological causes of somatic symptoms than the delusion group. The
results also indicate that there are no significant differences between all three groups'
attributions of somatic symptoms to a normal or somatic cause. In addition, the
delusion group, followed closely by the panic group, offered similar numbers of
alternative interpretations of somatic symptoms in comparison to the healthy
volunteers.
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Nevertheless, the results partially support hypothesis two because although the clinical
groups reported similar numbers of somatic symptoms, the delusional group do not
attribute them to a psychological cause as strongly as the panic group. The 'other'
themes did not detect any delusional content, however, the delusions group were the
only group to offer what could be considered as ambiguous interpretations. It may be
argued that the lower levels of attribution to psychological causes are suggestive of
protecting the self.
3.3.3. Hypothesis 3: (a) There will be significant differences between the clinical
groups and the healthy control group on all measures. (b)Factors that differ
between the clinical groups that might help explain any differences in their
interpretations of common somatic symptoms will be explored.
Significant differences were found between the clinical and healthy groups on state
and trait anxiety as well as psychological attributions to somatic symptoms. However,
no significant differences were found between the clinical groups and healthy control
group on levels of somatising and normalising attributions to common somatic
symptoms.
Hypothesis 3 assumed that there would be differences between the panic and delusion
groups' interpretations of common somatic symptoms. Unexpectedly, no significant
differences were found, however, tentatively, there was partial support for hypothesis
two and further differences between the clinical groups may help gain insight into
these possible differences between clinical groups' interpretations of common somatic
symptoms.
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The results of the dependent variables 'interpretations' and 'anxiety' have already
been addressed by the results pertaining to hypotheses 1 and 2, therefore the
remaining 5 dependent variables (l=metacognitions; 2=delusional ideation;
3=Emotionality; 4=experiential avoidance; and 5=self-esteem) will be addressed
below, (see Table 3.4)
3.3.3.1 Metacognitions
Box plots highlighted two outliers in the metacognitions data (one score in the
delusions group was low and another in the healthy control group was high). For this
reason and due to non-normal distribution of data in the panic group, non-parametric
tests were used. Descriptive statistics show that the clinical groups scored higher than
the healthy control group on median metacognition scores and illustrate the
overlapping range between the groups (see Table 3.4)
A Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect for total scores
between groups on metacognitions (% (2) = 19.08, p < .0001). A Dunn's post hoc
multiple comparison test revealed a significant difference between the healthy control
group and the panic group (mean rank difference=l6.660, p<001) and between the
healthy group and the delusions group (mean rank difference=l8.021, p<001) with
individuals in the clinical groups scoring higher on metacognitions than those in the
healthy control group. There were no significant differences between the two clinical
groups.
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Table 3.4 Descriptive statistics for all dependent variables explored in hypothesis 3 for each
group.






































































































































































































































































Wendy Prentice 82 D. Clin. Psychol
3.3.3.1.1 Positive beliefs about worry
The metacognitions subscale 'positive beliefs about worry' includes 6 statements like
'worrying helps me to avoid problems in the future', and scores for this subscale can
range from 6 to 24. Exploratory analysis revealed one outlier in the healthy control
group representing a participant who scored higher than the others in the group.
Descriptive statistics show that the clinical groups' median scores were higher than
that of the healthy control group. It also illustrates the overlap in scores between all
three groups (see table 3.4).
A one-way Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA indicated a significant difference between
groups' total scores (y,2(2) = 10.295, p<.01). A Dunn's multiple post hoc comparison
test of the three groups revealed that the significant differences lay between the
healthy control group and the delusion group (mean rank difference=l 1.844, p<05),
and between the healthy control group and the panic group (mean rank
difference^ 3.318, p<.05), with the clinical groups reporting higher levels of positive
beliefs about worry than the healthy control group. There were no significant
differences between the two clinical groups.
3.3.3.1.2 Negative beliefs about the uncontrollability of thoughts and corresponding
danger.
The 'negative beliefs about the uncontrollability of thoughts and corresponding
danger' subscale includes 6 items and can elicit a score between 6 and 24. Descriptive
statistics show that the clinical groups showed higher levels of these negative beliefs
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than the healthy control group (see Table 3.4). It also illustrates that there is an
overlap between groups and only the clinical groups reported maximum scores.
A Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference between groups
(X2(2) = 20.669, p<.0001). A Dunn's multiple post hoc comparison test of the three
groups indicate that the significant differences lay between the healthy control group
and the delusion group (mean rank difference=l6.965, p<.001), and between the
healthy control group and the panic group (mean rank difference=18.979, p<001),
with the clinical groups reporting higher levels of negative beliefs about
uncontroliability and danger than the healthy control group. There were no
significant differences between the two clinical groups.
3.3.3.1.3 Cognitive confidence
The 'cognitive confidence' subscale includes 6 items and can elicit a score between 6
and 24. Examples of statements include T have little confidence in my memory for
words and names' and 'my memory can mislead me at times'. Higher scores on this
subscale indicate lower levels of cognitive confidence.
Two high scoring outliers in the healthy control group were highlighted by a box plot.
This ensured, along with the results from the parametric assumption tests that non-
parametric tests were used. Descriptive statistics show that the clinical groups
reported higher scores and therefore lower levels of cognitive confidence than the
healthy control group (see Table 3.4). It also illustrates that there is an overlap
between groups' scores.
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A Kruskal -Wallis one way ANOVA was performed to determine whether the
differences between groups were significant for levels of cognitive confidence. The
2
analysis indicated a significant difference between groups (x (2) = 11.954, p < .01). A
Dunn's post hoc multiple comparison test revealed that there was a significant
difference between the delusion group and the healthy control group (mean rank
difference=14.844, p<.01) with the delusion group experiencing lower levels of
cognitive confidence than the healthy group. There were no significant differences
between the two clinical groups or the healthy group and the panic group.
3.3.3.1.4 Need to control thoughts
The 'need to control thoughts' subscale includes 6 items and can elicit a score
between 6 and 24. Examples of statements include 'It is bad to think certain thoughts'
and 'I should be in control of my thoughts all the time'. Higher scores on this
subscale indicate a greater need to control thoughts.
Exploratory analysis revealed one high scoring outlier in the healthy control group.
This ensured, along with the results from the parametric assumption tests that non-
parametric tests were used. Descriptive statistics show that the clinical groups
expressed a greater need to control thoughts than the healthy control group (see Table
3.4). It also illustrates that there is an overlap between groups' scores.
A Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA revealed significant differences on the results for
the need to control thoughts between group (x2(2) = 13.395, p < .01). A Dunn's
multiple post hoc comparison test of the three groups indicate that the significant
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differences lay between the healthy control group and the delusion group (mean rank
difference = 14.733, p<.01), and between the healthy control group and the panic
group (mean rank difference = 13.824, p<.05), with the clinical groups reporting a
greater need to control thoughts than the healthy control group. There were no
significant differences between the two clinical groups.
3.3.3.1.5 Cognitive self consciousness
The 'cognitive self consciousness' subscale includes 6 items and can elicit a score
between 6 and 24. Examples of statements include 'I think a lot about my thoughts'
and '1 monitor my thoughts'. Higher scores on this subscale indicate a higher level of
self consciousness around thoughts.
Exploratory analysis and results of assumption tests suggested parametric tests would
be best used on this data. Descriptive statistics show that the clinical groups expressed
a higher level of cognitive self consciousness than the healthy control group (see
Table 3.4). It also illustrates that the clinical groups scored maximum levels of
cognitive self consciousness whereas the healthy control group did not, and that there
is an overlap between groups' scores.
A one-way ANOVA revealed significant results between groups on cognitive self
consciousness (F(2,39) = 7.217, p <.01). A Tukey-Kramer multiple post hoc
comparison test of the three groups indicate that the significant differences lay
between the healthy control group and the delusion group (q=4.525, p<.01), and
between the healthy control group and the panic group (q=4.676, p<.01), with the
clinical groups reporting a higher level of cognitive self consciousness than the
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healthy control group. There were no significant differences between the two clinical
groups.
3.3.3.2. Delusional ideation
Descriptive statistics illustrate that the delusions group scored higher than the other 2
groups for overall levels of delusional ideation, and the panic group showed greater
levels of delusional ideation than the healthy control group (see Table 3.4). Due to
heterogeneity of variance, non-parametric tests were used.
A Kruskal -Wallis one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect for overall scores
on delusional ideation between groups (%2(2) = 25.91, p < .0001). A Dunn's post hoc
multiple comparison test revealed that there was a significant difference between the
healthy control group and the panic group (mean rank difference=l4.030, p<.05) and
between the healthy group and the delusions group (mean rank difference=22.292,
p<001) with the clinical groups scoring higher on levels of delusional ideation than
the control group. However, there are large standard deviations for each group on
Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (PDI) scores. Large standard deviations on the PDI
scores for the delusions group may indicate a problem with either the way that
delusions were measured or that the individuals in the delusions group may not have
been experiencing delusions as part of a delusional syndrome. In addition, there were
no significant differences found between the clinical groups on measures of
interpretation. This may be due to the way in which the interpretations were measured
or it could be a reflection of similarities of the groups given that a diagnosis was not
part of the inclusion criteria.
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Surprisingly, there were no significant differences between the two clinical groups
even though the descriptive statistics (see Table 3.4) raise expectations that there
would be. It should be acknowledged that the non-significant difference between the
clinical groups' may be the result of a Type II error.
3.3.3.2.1 Yes/No scores
Descriptive statistics showed that the delusions group endorsed more delusional ideas
offered by the questionnaire than the other two groups with panic endorsing less than
the delusion group, and the healthy control group endorsed the least amount of
delusional ideas (see Table 3.4). Due to heterogeneity of variance and lack of normal
distribution in the healthy control group, non-parametric statistics were used.
A Kruskal -Wallis one-way ANOVA indicated a significant effect for overall scores
on delusional ideation between groups (%2(2) = 25.86, p < .0001). A Dunn's post hoc
multiple comparison test revealed that there was a significant difference between the
healthy control group and the delusion group (mean rank difference=22.340, p<.001).
However, the differences between the healthy control group and the panic group did
not reach significance, and there were no significant differences between the two
clinical groups.
3.3.3.2.2 Levels ofdistress caused by delusional ideation between groups
Descriptive statistics revealed that the delusions group showed higher levels of
delusional distress than the other two groups with panic showing lower levels of
distress than delusion group and the healthy control group showed the least amount of
delusional distress (see Table 3.4). Due to heterogeneity of variance and lack of
nonnal distribution in the healthy control group, non-parametric statistics were used.
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A Kruskal -Wallis one-way ANOVA revealed significant differences for overall
scores on delusional distress between groups (x2(2) = 24.995, p < .0001). A Dunn's
post hoc multiple comparison test revealed that there was a significant difference
between the healthy control group and the delusion group (mean rank
difiference=21.785, p<.001), and between the healthy control group and the panic
group (mean rank difference=14.385, p<.01.) However, there were no significant
differences between the two clinical groups.
3.3.3.2.3 Levels of delusional conviction between groups
Descriptive statistics illustrate that the delusions group showed higher levels of
delusional conviction than the other two groups with panic showing lower levels of
conviction than the delusion group, and the healthy control group showed the least
amount of delusional conviction (see Table 3.4). Due to heterogeneity of variance,
non-parametric statistics were used.
A Kruskal -Wallis one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference for overall
scores on delusional conviction between groups (x (2) = 24.135, p < .0001). A
Dunn's post hoc multiple comparison test revealed that there was a significant
difference between the healthy control group and the delusion group (mean rank
difiference=21.542, p<.001), and between the healthy control group and the panic
group (mean rank difiference=13.21., p<05). However, there were no significant
differences between the two clinical groups.
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3.3.3.2.4. Levels of delusional preoccupation between groups
Descriptive statistics showed that the delusions group showed higher levels of
delusional preoccupation than the other two groups, with panic showing lower levels
of preoccupation than the delusion group and the healthy control group showed the
least amount of delusional preoccupation (see Table 3.4). Due to heterogeneity of
variance, non-parametric statistics were used.
A Kruskal -Wallis one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference for scores on
delusional preoccupation between groups (%2(2) = 26.044, p < .0001). A Dunn's post
hoc multiple comparison test revealed that there was a significant difference between
the healthy control group and the delusion group (mean rank difference=22.352,
p<001), and between the healthy control group and the panic group (mean rank
difference=13.815, p<.05). However, there were no significant differences between
the two clinical groups.
3.3.3.3. Emotionality
3.3.3.3.1 State Emotionality
Descriptive statistics illustrate that the clinical groups showed similar mean levels of
state emotionality which were higher than those of the healthy control group (see
Table 3.4).
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A one way ANOVA revealed significant differences for state emotionality between
the three groups (F(2, 39)=10.831, p<.001). A Tukey Kramer multiple comparison
test found that the significance lay between the healthy control group and the two
clinical groups with the former scoring significantly lower on overall scores of state
emotionality than both clinical groups (delusions vs. healthy control q=5.196, p<.01;
panic vs. healthy control q=6, p<.001). There were no significant differences found
on overall scores of state emotionality between the two clinical groups.
Parametric assumptions were violated for state and trait emotionality subscales,
therefore non-parametric tests were used to analyse the data. A summary of the state
emotionality subscale scores (see figure 3.3) show that the healthy control group
scored lower on all emotions that may be thought of as being negative than the clinical
groups and scored higher on levels of happiness than the clinical groups.
A one way Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA revealed significant differences between scores
for the subscales of state emotionality between the three groups and a significant
effect was found for fear (x2(2) = 15.024, p < .001); disgust (%2(2) = 14.621, p < .001);
anger (x2(2) = 13.283, p < .01); sadness (x2(2) = 21.121, p < .0001) and happiness
(X2(2) = 10.529, p<.01).
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Figure 3.3 Median scores of state emotionality subscales by group
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Dunn's multiple comparison test found that the clinical groups showed significantly
more fear (healthy vs. delusion: mean rank difference=13.096, p<01; healthy vs
panic: mean rank difference= 17.352, pc.Ol), disgust (healthy vs. delusion: mean rank
difference=12.1, p<.05; healthy vs. panic: mean rank difference=l 7.145, p<.001),
anger (healthy vs. delusion: mean rank difference=l2.944, p<01; healthy vs. panic:
mean rank difiference=l 5.918, p<.01), and sadness (healthy vs. delusion: mean rank
difference=16.181, p<.001; healthy vs. panic: mean rank difference= 19.991, p<.001)
than the healthy control group. The healthy control group showed significantly
higher levels of happiness than the delusion group (healthy vs. delusion: mean rank
difference—11.948, p<.05), and the panic group (healthy vs. panic: mean rank
difference—13.803, p<.05).
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Significant differences were found between the clinical groups and the healthy control
group on all state emotionality subscales. The panic group scored slightly higher than
the delusion group on all four negative emotionality subscales. They had the same
mean and median scores for state happiness. However, there were no significant
differences found between the two clinical groups on any of the subscales.
3.3.3.3.2 Trait Emotionality
Descriptive statistics show that the clinical groups showed higher levels of trait
emotionality than the healthy control group and the clinical groups showed similar
levels (see Table 3.4).
A Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference between groups
on scores of trait emotionality (y2(2) = 19.486, p < .0001). A Dunn's post hoc
multiple comparison test revealed that there was a significant difference between the
healthy control group and the delusion group (mean rank difference=17.388, p<.001),
and between the healthy control group and the panic group (mean rank
difference=l 7.473, p<.001) with the healthy control group scoring significantly lower
than the clinical groups. However, there were no significant differences between the
two clinical groups.
A summary of the trait emotionality subscale scores (see figure 3.4) show that the
healthy control group scored lower on all emotions that may be thought of as being
negative, than the clinical groups and scored higher on levels of happiness than the
clinical groups.
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A one way Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA was carried out on the scores for the subscales of
trait emotionality between the three groups and a significant effect was found for fear
(X2(2) = 15.632, p < .001); disgust (X2(2) = 15.839, p < .001); anger (X2(2) = 21.185, p
< .0001); sadness (X2(2) = 22.863, p < .0001) and happiness (X2(2) = 16.709, p <
.001).
A Dunn's multiple comparison test found that the clinical groups showed significantly
more fear (healthy vs. panic: mean rank difference—18.158, p<.001; healthy vs.
delusion: mean rank difference—12.629, p<.05), disgust (healthy vs. delusion: mean
rank difference=l4.306, p<.01; healthy vs. panic: mean rank difference= 16.991,
p<.01), anger (healthy vs. delusion: mean rank difference=17.319, p<.001; healthy vs.
panic: mean rank difference=19.1, p<.001), and sadness (healthy vs. delusion: mean
rank difference^8.535, p<.001; healthy vs. panic: mean rank difference—19.112,
p<.001) than the healthy control group. The healthy control group showed
significantly higher levels of happiness than the delusion group (mean rank
difference—13.373, p<.01), and the panic group (mean rank difference—18.603,
pc.001). There were no significant differences found between the two clinical groups
on any of the subscales.
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3.3.3.3.3 Emotional coping
A summary of mean emotional coping scores is given in Figure 3.5. Lower scores
represent a greater ability to cope with emotions and higher scores represent lesser
ability to cope with emotions. This data suggests that the panic group were the least
able to cope with emotions followed by the delusions group, and the healthy control
group reported a greater ability than the clinical groups to cope with emotions.
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Figure 3.5 Mean scores between groups on overall ability to cope with emotions
Delusions Group Panic Group Healthy control Group
Group
A one way ANOVA revealed a significant difference between the three groups for
coping ability (F(2, 39)=8.225, p<.01). A Tukey Kramer multiple comparison test
found that the significance lay between the healthy control group and the delusions
group (q=3.734, p< 05) and between the healthy control group and the panic group
(q=5.594, p<.001) with the healthy control group showing a significantly greater
ability to cope with emotions than the two clinical groups. There were no significant
differences found on overall scores of emotional coping ability between the two
clinical groups.
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3.3.3.4. Experiential Avoidance
Descriptive statistics show that the panic group reported greater levels of experiential
avoidance than the other two groups and the healthy control group scored the greatest
levels of acceptance and action (see Table 3.4). Due to heterogeneity of variance,
non-parametric statistics were used.
A Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA revealed a significant difference between groups
scores for experiential avoidance (x,2(2) = 24.626, p < .0001). A Dunn's post hoc
multiple comparison test revealed that there was a significant difference between the
healthy control group and the delusion group (mean rank difference=T 7.588, p<.001),
and between the healthy control group and the panic group (mean rank
difference=21.764, p<.001) with the healthy control group scoring significantly lower
than the clinical groups on levels of experiential avoidance. However, there were no
significant differences between the two clinical groups on overall scores of
experiential avoidance.
3.3.3.5. Self Esteem
Descriptive statistics show that the healthy control group have higher levels of self-
esteem than the two clinical groups (see Table 3.4). Exploratory analysis found that
there were three outliers in the self-esteem data (2 in the healthy control group: one
was a low score and the other high, and 1 low scoring outlier in the panic group). For
this reason non-parametric tests were used.
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A Kruskal-Wallis one way ANOVA revealed significant differences between the three
groups on levels of self-esteem (x2(2) = 22.879, p < .0001). A Dunn's multiple
comparison test found that the significance lay between the healthy control group and
the two clinical groups with the former scoring significantly higher on levels of self-
esteem than both the delusion group (mean rank difference—17.723, p<.001) and the
panic group (mean rank difference=-20.294, p<.001). There were no significant
differences found on self-esteem scores between the two clinical groups suggesting
that they reported similar levels of self-esteem.
3.3.3.6. Summary of findings for hypothesis 3
The results largely support hypothesis 3a because, as expected, significant differences
were found between the clinical groups and the healthy control group on all measures
except on the metacognition subscale of cognitive confidence and the number of
delusional ideation items endorsed on the PDI. In both these case, the difference
between the panic and healthy control group did not reach significance.
With regards to hypothesis 3b, no significant differences were found between the
clinical groups on all measures. Having said this, the delusional group reported much
higher levels of delusional ideation, delusional distress, delusional conviction,
delusional preoccupation, and endorsed a higher number of delusional ideation items
than the panic group, although these differences did not reach significance. This may
be due to a type II error and possibly with equal sample sizes, or indeed bigger
samples these difference may reach significance. In addition, the delusions group
reported less cognitive confidence, and slightly lower levels of state emotionality and
experiential avoidance along with slightly higher levels of self-esteem.
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Chapter 4: Discussion
4.1: Summary of findings
The main aim of this study was to look at the similarities as well as differences
between the clinical groups and the clinical and control groups in the context of the
continuum model. The pattern of results supported some of the hypotheses and not
others. Firstly, both clinical groups expressed similar levels of anxiety. Secondly,
both clinical groups experienced a similar number of common somatic symptoms, and
there is partial support for the idea that the clinical groups interpreted somatic
symptoms differently, however, this is tentative. Thirdly, of all the variables that we
hypothesised might lead to different interpretations between the clinical groups, none
of them approached a meaningful difference.
The continuum model was largely supported in the context of psychosis. This was
evidenced by an increasingly larger number of items on the Peter's Delusions
Inventory (PDI) being endorsed between groups. The healthy control group endorsed
the lowest number of delusional ideas (mean=2.7, SD=2.06), followed by the panic
group (mean=6, SD=2.19), and the delusions group endorsed the most delusional
ideas (mean=11.25, SD=4.01). The differences between the delusion group and the
healthy control group were significant, however it should be noted that the differences
between the numbers of items endorsed by the panic group were not significantly
different from those endorsed by the healthy control group, and the differences
between the clinical groups were not significantly different. It is not clear why this is
the case. In this study, the panic group scores were similar to those of Peters et a/.'s
(2004) healthy control group, and the delusion group scores between the two studies
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were similar, suggesting a similar result of a significant difference should occur.
However, Peters et al. (2004) used different non-parametric tests due to the study
design. It is possible that a significant difference has not been detected (Type II error)
due to small and unequal sample sizes. The continuum model is further supported by
the overlap in the range of delusional items endorsed between groups (see table 3.4 in
results section).
The pattern of the overall 'delusional ideation' scores were reflective of the pattern of
scores for the PDI subscales: distress, conviction, and preoccupation. There were
significant differences between the clinical groups and the healthy control group on all
measures, and there were no significant differences between the clinical groups. This
supports Morrison's (2001) theory that there are similarities between the formation
and maintenance ofpanic and delusions.
As expected, anxiety levels were similar amongst the panic group and the delusions
group and these anxiety levels were significantly higher than those of the healthy
control group, which supports findings by Fraser et al. (2006) and Livingstone et al.
(2008). Emotions other than anxiety, namely depression, anger and disgust, have been
implicated in Persecutory delusions (Freeman & Garety, 2003) and were measured in
the present study using the Basic Emotions Scale (BES; Power, 2006). The results of
this study are similar to those of Suslow et al. (2003) and Livingstone et al. (2008) in
that significant differences were found between the psychosis group and the healthy
control group for fear, disgust, sadness and happiness (Joy in Suslow's 2003 study),
with the psychosis group experiencing higher levels of the more negative emotions
and lower levels of joy/happiness than the healthy control group. This supports
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previous research implicating emotions in psychopathology, and suggests that emotion
plays a role in development and/or maintenance ofpsychosis and panic disorder.
An interesting finding of this study was that the clinical groups reported significantly
higher levels of anger than the healthy control groups. This finding is interesting as it
contrasts with data reported by Suslow (2003) and Livingstone et al. (2008), which
found no significant differences between groups on anger levels. On examination of
the results (Livingstone, personal communication, 2008) the differences lay in the
healthy control group scores. The control group for the present study appeared to
have lower scores than the Livingstone study. Freeman et al. (2001) also found no
raised levels of anger in individuals who were experiencing persecutory delusions.
Therefore, this finding adds to the sparse but inconsistent findings in the literature
with regards to persecutory delusions and anger (Freeman, 2003). However, these
results also suggest that the anger levels of individuals who experience persecutory
delusions are similar to those experienced by individuals who suffer from panic
disorder. Furthermore, the clinical groups showed higher levels of fear than any other
emotion, whereas the control group scored higher on happiness than any other
emotion.
Emotional coping as measured by the BES showed that the clinical groups were
significantly less able to cope with emotions than the healthy control group and
interestingly, the panic group were less able to cope with emotions than the delusion
group, however this difference was not significant.
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Self-esteem levels, as measured by the self concept questionnaire (SCQ), were found
to be significantly higher in the healthy control group as compared with the clinical
groups. This finding is consistent with previous research findings implicating low
self-esteem in a number of mental health problems including psychosis (Silverstone,
1991; Hall & Tarrier, 2003). Self-esteem is reported to be implicated in the formation
and maintenance of psychotic disorders (Hall & Tarrier, 2003), therefore is another
factor which is important in individual therapy.
Experiential avoidance (EA), more recently referred to as 'psychological flexibility' in
the context of the acceptance and action questionnaire (AAQ-II), is a safety behaviour
that has been implicated as influencing psychopathology. The results of this study
support this idea, as evidenced by the clinical groups, showing significantly higher
experiential avoidance and therefore less psychological flexibility than the healthy
control group. This suggests that individuals from both clinical groups use avoidance
strategies, and that they have lower levels of psychological flexibility and acceptance
than healthy controls. These findings are in line with previous research that found
avoidance was frequently used by people with persecutory delusions (Freeman et al.,
2001). Avoidance is also implicated in the maintenance of delusional beliefs
(Freeman et al., 2002; Morrison, 2001), therefore, it should be recognised in the
assessment, formulation and treatment of psychosis.
Metacognitions are beliefs about thoughts that may, for example, have a worry content
or delusional content. The findings of the present study support previous research
(Morrison & Wells, 2007) and theories (Self-Regulatory Executive Function; S-REF
model) in this area which implicate dysfunctional metacognitions in psychopathology.
Wendy Prentice 102 D. Clin. Psychol
The clinical groups expressed higher levels of dysfunctional metacognitions than the
healthy control group. This is in line with Morrison & Well's (2007) study who found
that people with psychosis showed higher levels of metacognitive beliefs than non-
patients. Interestingly, the 'need to control thoughts' metacognitions subscale only
found a significant difference between the delusions group and the healthy control
group, and although the panic group showed higher levels of dysfunctional
metacognitive beliefs than the healthy control group, the differences were not
significant. A type II error cannot be ruled out as a cause for this finding, however, if
this result is replicated in future research with larger sample sizes, it may have clinical
implications. On the other hand, there is a possibility that a type 1 error could
account for this finding because a number of comparisons were made which increases
the familywise error rate.
The S-REF model implicates metacognitive beliefs in the vulnerability to and
maintenance of psychopathology (Morrison et al., 2007). In addition, Morrison
(2005) suggests that positive metacognitive beliefs such as 'being suspicious of others
keeps me safe' are associated with the occurrence of psychotic phenomena, and that
negative beliefs such as 'I'm mad' are associated with the distress as a result of them.
For this reason, it seems important that metacognitions should also be assessed, and
integrated into the formulation and intervention of psychotic experiences.
The present study found significant differences between the clinical groups and the
healthy control group on weight given to psychological interpretations of somatic
symptoms (e.g. If I had a prolonged headache, I would probably think that it is
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because I am emotionally upset). The clinical groups reported significantly higher
levels of psychological attributions than the healthy control group. In addition, the
clinical groups and the healthy control group showed similar levels of normalising
(e.g. IfI had a prolonged headache I would probably think that it is because a loud
noise, bright light or something else has irritated me) and somaticising (e.g. IfI had a
prolonged headache I would probably think that there is something wrong with my
muscles, nerves or brain) attributions of common somatic experiences. This suggests
that there may be an association between psychologising attributions and
psychopathology. However, future research with bigger sample sizes is needed to
validate these findings. There is also some uncertainty of what the Symptom
Interpretation Questionnaire (SIQ) is actually measuring (Aronson, 2006) therefore it
may be helpful to use a different questionnaire in future research. No previous studies
have used this questionnaire in these populations therefore no direct comparisons can
be made.
Surprisingly, there were no significant differences between the clinical groups in their
interpretation of somatic symptoms. Morrison (2007) suggests that individuals who
experience panic and those who experience delusions similarly arrive at explanations
of internal experiences through normal reasoning processes. It is also acknowledged
that they are separate disorders, and that their interpretations are distinct. Therefore, it
was expected that there would be differences in somatic interpretations between the
clinical groups. Possible differences were implicated by the data in that the delusion
group reported higher levels of psychologising attributions than the panic group, and
these differences were approaching significance (p=.056). Further differences were
indicated by the results of 'other' interpretations. As previously described, the SIQ
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was adapted so that externalising attributions other than those given within the
questionnaire could be recorded. From those 'other' interpretations offered, the
delusions group alone offered attributions which could be interpreted in different ways
and were labelled 'ambiguous' in the results (e.g. 'If I was sweating a lot, I would
think it is because: "Maybe outside forces"). A cautionary stance should be taken
with these findings as theses differences were not significant and therefore only
provide partial support for the idea that the clinical groups interpret somatic symptoms
differently.
Another interesting finding in this study was that the delusions group did not offer any
delusional interpretations and the panic group offered no catastrophising
interpretations for common somatic symptoms. One possible explanation for this is
that the somatic experiences may need to be anomalous rather than common in order
to induce delusional explanations. As mentioned previously, Morrison (2002)
suggests that in individuals who are predisposed to psychosis, a delusion will be
formed by a stressor (e.g. life event) which may cause arousal, which in turn will
induce an inner-outer confusion (Fowler, 2000), which in turn will cause an
anomalous experience (e.g. misinterpreting thoughts as voices) of which an
explanation will be sought. This suggests that an anomalous experience is necessary
before a delusional explanation will occur. However, Bell, Halligan and Ellis (2008)
would disagree. They carried out a study to determine whether pathological levels of
anomalous perceptual experiences were necessary to account for the presence of
delusions, and found that this was not the case. They measured anomalous perceptual
experiences in a non clinical sample, a group of non hallucinating delusional patients,
and a group of hallucinating delusional patients. They found that there were no
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significant differences between any of the groups on any of the anomalous perceptual
experience indices on the Cardiff Anomolous Perception Scale (CAPS). The authors
concluded that 'pathological levels of anomalous perceptual experience, as measured
by the Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale, are not necessary to account for the
presence of all delusions'.
Overall, the results show a lack of differences between the two clinical groups, with
the exception of the possibility that the delusion group may show a stronger bias for
psychological attributions of common somatic symptoms than the panic group.
However, as mentioned earlier, this is a tentative result. Again, with the exception of
this result, the research and cognitive theories underlying each of the variables
measured are supported by these results.
4.2. Clinical and theoretical implications
Each of the variables measured within this study (e.g. metacognitions) have
implications for clinical work. Cognitive models of psychosis tend to emphasise
different factors. For example metacognitions are emphasised in Morrison's (2001)
model whereas the model proposed by Freeman et al. (2002) emphasises the role of
emotion in persecutory delusions. However, if all of these variables are implicated in
psychosis, it suggests that they should all be assessed and be integrated into clients'
formulations and intervention plans. As with all therapies, this should be in
accordance with the needs of the client and with how each factor is affecting their
everyday life. A number of authors have pointed out that psychosis is a complex
phenomena and in the same way that each cognitive model emphasises different
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symptoms within psychosis, it would be expected that clients too present with a
different emphasis on what factors cause the most difficulties for them.
The results regarding the interpretations of common somatic symptoms suggest that
the psychologising of somatic symptoms (e.g. If my stomach was upset I would
probably think it was because I've worried myself sick) may be implicated in
psychopathology as evidenced by the two clinical groups putting significantly more
weight on psychological attributions for common somatic symptoms than the healthy
control group. It could be argued that the larger number of females in this study could
account for the higher psychologising scores in the clinical groups as a previous study
has found that psychologisers were more likely to be female and normalisers and
somatisers to be male (Kessler et al., 1999). However, if this were the case, we would
expect to find higher levels of somatising or normalising in the delusions group as this
group predominantly consisted ofmales.
Psychologising may be associated with the formation of persecutory beliefs. For
example, if a loss of appetite was attributed to the psychological attribution 'I'm
worrying so much that food just doesn't taste good anymore', this attribution could be
considered as evidence that there is something to worry about which in turn could
cause a misinterpretation of other people's actions as threatening, which results in
distress. This example is in line with Freeman's (2002) formation model of
persecutory delusions. He suggests that in individuals who experience psychosis, a
delusion will be formed by a stressor (e.g. life event) which may cause arousal, which
in turn will induce an inner-outer contusion (Fowler, 2000), which in turn will cause
an anomalous experience (e.g. misinterpreting thoughts as voices) of which an
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explanation will be sought. This explanation will depend on things like beliefs,
emotions, metacognitions, cognitive flexibility and cognitive biases. If
psychologising is involved in the formation of persecutory beliefs, being aware of
them and when they occur will help to prevent these distressing beliefs from
occurring. Therefore, psychologising attributions should be assessed and then
formulated in collaboration with the client to inform treatment plans.
A reduction of psychologising attributions may be of use in the treatment stage of
therapy. Williams (2002) described a young woman who experienced less distress
when normalising her experiences in therapy. It may be that the increased
normalising interpretations were actually serving to reduce psychologising appraisals.
However, research looking at the relationship between psychologising attributions and
distress is needed in the delusions population to confirm or deny the importance of
these attributions.
With regards to emotions, the clinical groups showed significantly higher levels of the
more negative emotions than the healthy control group and significantly less levels of
happiness which suggests that emotions are important in persecutory delusions as well
as panic. Emotions are central to Freeman's (2002) model of persecutory delusions
and are implicated in both the formation and maintenance of persecutory beliefs, and
therefore, should also be incorporated throughout the course of individual clinical
work.
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Emotional coping, as measured by the BES in the present study, showed that the
clinical groups were less able to cope with emotions than the healthy control group.
Therefore increasing emotional coping strategies during the treatment stage is
important. As Bach et al. (2006) states, people who experience delusions are
hospitalised not because they are experiencing delusional beliefs but because they are
behaving in a non acceptable way in response to those beliefs. Therefore, learning to
cope with the beliefs could impact on behaviour and reduce rehospitalisation rates.
Metacognitions have also been identified in this study as having a role in
psychopathology evidenced again by the significant differences between the clinical
groups and the healthy control group. These findings, along with the previous
research and theories implicating metacognitions (e.g. S-REF model and Morrison's
(2001) cognitive model) suggests that clinicians should carefully assess the
metacognitive beliefs held by their clients, as these are implicated as being
significantly more dysfunctional in both panic disorder patients and delusional
patients, compared to non disordered individuals.
A careful assessment of self-esteem should also be carried out because, in addition to
the literature which suggests that individuals experiencing delusions tend to
experience low self-esteem, the present results also suggest that individuals who
experience panic as well as those who experience delusions, show significantly lower
levels of self-esteem than non-disordered individuals. This has implications for
individual therapy in that clinician's should be at least aware of the issues that impact
on the individual's self-esteem and monitoring any changes that occur.
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Significantly higher levels of experiential avoidance were found amongst the clinical
groups compared with the healthy control group. This also has implications for
individual therapy in the assessment, formulation and treatment of difficulties as
avoidance is often implicated in the maintenance ofmany different disorders.
The results also provide support for Morrison's (2001) cognitive model of psychosis,
which is based on Clark's (1986) model of panic. The evidence provided by this
study is the consistent similarities in scores on many variables. This suggests that
Morrison's model may be useful to inform the assessment, formulations and treatment
of at least some individuals experiencing persecutory delusions.
Another finding within this study which has potential clinical implications is from the
'other' interpretations offered by a participant from the delusions group. This
participant gave statements which could be interpreted in more than one way. For
example, (as mentioned earlier), in response to the statement 'If 1 was sweating a lot, I
would think it is because:' a participant wrote: "Maybe outside forces". It is possible
that this could be attributed to weather conditions or something more bizarre-like,
however not enough information was gathered to clarity this answer. It is possible
that clinician's may misinterpret client's attributions as delusional within clinic
settings. Research shows that clinicians' misinterpretations of delusions can also
cause distress (e.g. Reeves & Torres, 2003). This has implications for training staff
working with people who experience psychosis. It may be helpful to train staff not to
focus on whether the interpretation is culturally acceptable or not but to gather more
information in order to understand it. This is important for a number of reasons; (a) if
clinicians can show an acceptance of client's experiences, clients are more likely to
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accept their experiences rather than trying to control them; (b) the more knowledge
gained, the more tailored the treatment plan will be for that particular person, and (c)
reduction of stigma attached to psychosis.
It seems that this study has a number of clinical implications particularly for
individual therapy and staff training. However, it is important to acknowledge that
these implications are not solely based on the present study, but are also based on
previous research and theories behind it.
Overall, the findings of the present study support the cognitive models that implicate
higher levels of 'negative' emotions, dysfunctional metacognitions, avoidance (safety
behaviours), unhelpful interpretations and low self-esteem in people who experience
persecutory delusions as well as those who experience panic. However, there was an
absence of significant differences between the clinical groups in their interpretations
of common somatic symptoms. This finding may be due to the way in which somatic
attributions were measured. Future research may provide a better understanding of
attributions between these groups of people using a different measure. Perhaps with
the Cardiff Anomolous experiences Scale (CAPS; which measures anomalous
experiences as opposed to common ones.
Measuring interpretations of experiences is important because appraisals of
experiences are central to the model developed by Garety et al. (2001) as well as
being implicated in both Morrison's (2001) model and Freeman's (2002) model. It
was expected that the delusion group would express more culturally unacceptable
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interpretations than the panic group because, as Maher (1974) suggested,
physiological arousal as well as external events can cause delusional explanations.
However, as mentioned previously, there is tentative support for these differences.
Jaspers (1963) suggested that there was a distinction between the neuroses and
psychoses. The results from this study suggest in line with Morrison (2001) that there
are similarities between them. Continual overlapping of scores between all three
groups throughout the results lend support to the continuum as opposed to the
categorical model. In addition, if the healthy-affect-psychosis continuum model were
to hold true, expectations for the present study include increasingly higher scores from
healthy control group to panic group, and highest scores for delusions group on
delusion proneness as measured by the PDI. The results generally support this
hypothesis with the delusions group reporting the highest levels of delusional ideation
and the healthy control group the lowest and the panic group in between. The
differences between the clinical groups did not reach significance but maybe in a
study with a larger sample size, these differences would be significant. So although
the general pattern of results support the healthy-affect-psychosis continuum model,
this implication should be treated with caution unless fiiture studies with bigger
sample sizes can validate these results.
Significantly higher levels of dysfunctional metacognitions were found in the clinical
groups as compared with the healthy control groups, which lends support to the S-Ref
model's prediction that metacognitions play a role in psychopathology. The high
levels of dysfunctional metacognitions also lend support to Morrison's (2001) model
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which implicates metacognitions in psychosis. The significantly high levels of
anxiety and other emotions experienced by the clinical groups compared with those of
the healthy control group also supports Morrison's suggestion that anxiety disorders
and psychosis are similar in nature, and Freeman's (2002) model which implicates
emotions in persecutory delusions.
Morrison (2001) acknowledges that while there are similarities between anxiety and
psychosis, there is a difference between them in the cultural acceptability of
interpretations of internal experiences. In the present study, the opportunity to
express delusional and catastrophic explanations was given on the Symptom
Interpretation Questionnaire (SIQ) in which people could express 'other' causal
attributions for common somatic symptoms. However, no delusional interpretations
were offered by the delusional group and no catastrophic interpretations were offered
by the panic group. This raises questions about whether common somatic symptoms
alone, which are the same as those experienced under anxiety provoking conditions,
can trigger delusional thoughts. It also raises questions of whether persecutory beliefs
are situationally dependent and occur only under anxiety and fear provoking situations
or whether they are trait like in nature and all explanations of experiences are
delusional. Further questions raised are around whether somatic symptoms need to be
anomalous in nature in order to trigger a delusional belief. However, Bell et al.
(2008) conclude from their research using the Cardiff Anomalous Perception Scale
(CAPS) that anomalous experience is not necessary for delusions to occur.
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4.3. Strengths and Limitations of the research
The limitation that made the most impact on this study was the unequal sample sizes
which led to a reduction in power. This was due to recruitment issues. Changes were
made to the delivery of services which made it difficult to access individuals who
experienced panic. The small sample size for the panic group had implications for the
type of analyses used, and may have increased the likelihood of a significant effect not
being identified (Type II error). However, the results supported, where possible,
previous research and theoretical models underlying it.
A further limitation to this study was that the participants were recruited from
clinician's caseloads and therefore were subject to a possible selection bias. Some
potential participants who met criteria for the delusions group did not participate,
demonstrating a further possibility of bias in the recruitment stage of the research in
those who did take part.
Limited demographic data were collected, which has implications for the information
collected and the results. Although careful recruitment of individuals from the same
area was ensured for all three groups, there is no way of knowing their educational
levels, which may have had an impact on individuals understanding of the
questionnaires, and may have differed amongst groups. In addition, the groups may
have differed for other demographic variables, such as their socioeconomic status and
their marital status, which would have been helpful to know about when considering
the differences between groups as this would have had an impact on the results.
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It is important to acknowledge that although participants experienced current
persecutory delusions and current re-occurring panic attacks, these difficulties may not
have been the main difficulty that they experienced, which may have increased the
possible co-morbidity rates amongst participants. As it became clear that the
recruitment of both clinical groups was more difficult than previously anticipated, the
inclusion criteria was widened to include people who experienced ongoing panic
attacks but they did not necessarily need to have a diagnosis of panic disorder.
Similarly, the inclusion criteria was also widened for the delusion group so that people
did not necessarily have to have a diagnosis of delusional disorder or of any diagnosis
along the schizoaffective spectrum of disorders as long as they experienced regular
distressing persecutory ideation. The exclusion criteria stayed the same. This may
have diluted the diagnostic pool of participants that were originally expected to be
recruited. However, co-morbidity of symptoms is often found within clinical
populations, which could mean that these results are relevant to the kinds of people
seen by clinicians in NHS services.
All of the dependent variables in this study were measured using self report
questionnaires which may have an impact on the ecological validity of the results.
More recently, other more realistic ways of studying paranoid type thoughts are being
conducted with the use of virtual reality (VR). This may be more representative of
real life occurrences than questionnaire based studies which involve reflecting on
experiences. Studies using the virtual reality paradigm have been used successfully to
study persecutory thoughts (Freeman et al., 2005; 2007; 2008a; 2008b; Valmaggia et
al., 2007).
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One strength of the research is that participants experienced current delusion or panic
at the time of the study allowing present thoughts, emotions, behaviours and physical
sensations to be accessed rather than having to think about them retrospectively after a
period of recovery.
A further limitation of this study was that participants were recruited using an
opportunity sampling technique. Ethical limitations ensured that recruitment took
place in Lanarkshire alone which restricts generalisability. However, because all three
groups were recruited from the same area, it meant that environmental variables could
be minimised.
A further strength of this study was that the healthy participants had no history of
psychological difficulties and were not mental health professionals. This was ensured
to minimise other possible background variables. Strict exclusion criteria were
applied to also minimise possible confounding variables. For example people in the
panic group who had family members with psychosis were excluded so that their
answers on the delusional ideation questionnaire were not biased or a reflection of
predisposition to psychosis.
The research which has been carried out to date has focussed on studying one or two
variables implicated by cognitive theories at any one time. However, the present
study, due to its exploratory nature, was able to assess a number of variables within
one study.
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4.4 Areas for further research
There are many opportunities for future research in trying to answer the question of
what contributes to the differences in the interpretations of these particular two groups
as there has been very little research done in this area. One recent study (Freeman,
2008) used a virtual reality paradigm with a non clinical population to assess
differences between paranoid type beliefs and social anxiety in an attempt to answer
the question 'What makes one person paranoid and another person anxious?' He
found that the risk of paranoid reactions increased in the presence of perceptual
anomalies as measured by the CAPS (Bell et al., 2006). He also found that levels of
anxiety, depression, interpersonal sensitivity, and worry had similar relationships to
social anxiety and paranoia (Freeman, 2008). Similar research could be done with
panic and persecutory delusions to measure the differences between catastrophic
worry and distressing persecutory beliefs.
To prevent the possibility of clinicians, and other staff and carers from misinterpreting
potentially ambiguous statements made by people who experience delusions, research
could be carried out identifying staff and carers' attributional biases in relation to
delusional explanations. This would initially assess the need for a training program.
Following the outcome of this, if appropriate, a training plan could be developed with
the aim of increasing understanding of the nature of delusions amongst staff, families
and carers. This should include highlighting the normal continuum model, the
recovery model, and should involve users and carers in the rolling out of the training
plan. Staff, families and carers attributions may be assessed before and after the
training and possibly a 6 to 12 month follow up period to assess the effectiveness of
the training.
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Future research could also involve looking at variables that were not included in the
present study, such as measuring the performance between groups on a 'jumping to
conclusions' tasks. Replication of the present study using larger sample sizes and
possibly using logistical regression analysis to determine which factors best predict
the interpretations of internal experiences, would also be useful in a bid to answer the
research question.
Avoidance is an issue in maintaining many clinical difficulties and acceptance rather
than control is proposed to be helpful in reducing avoidance. Further research looking
at the effects of Acceptnce and Commitment Therapy (ACT) within the population of
people who experience distressing persecutory beliefs using a pre and post treatment
approach would also be helpful in informing clinical practice.
4.5 Conclusions
The results of this study suggest that there are few significant differences between
individuals who experience regular distressing panic attacks and individuals who
experience distressing persecutory beliefs in their interpretations of common bodily
symptoms or on some of the variables implicated in the cognitive models put forward
by Morrison (2001); Freeman (2002) and Garety et al. (2001).
If these results are replicated, and it is found that there are little differences between
the two groups in general. It may be that the differences are purely in the cultural
acceptability of their interpretations as Morrison suggests. If these results are
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replicated, it may have implications for training professionals working in this area as
well as implications for psychological treatment, so that professionals are able to
appraise delusional thoughts as being acceptable. However, it may be that delusional
and panic interpretations of internal experiences are different but only under
distressing circumstances with anomalous internal experiences.
Overall findings support the continuum model of psychosis because the clinical
groups scored significantly differently from the healthy control group on nearly all
measures, and there was consistent overlapping of scores between the groups. Given
that this is the first time research has been carried out measuring the interpretations of
common somatic symptoms between groups, and given the limitations to this study,
further research looking at whether there is a difference between these two clinical
groups in their interpretations other than their perceived cultural acceptability, would
be helpful in understanding and destigmatising psychosis.
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The purpose of this scale is to find out about how much or how often you experience certainemotions and then to ask some questions about how you feel actually during particular emotionsthemselves.
The first part of the scale is designed to explore how you have felt DURING THE LAST WEEK.For each emotion, please circle ONE number only between 1 and 7, to indicate how you have felt.
OVER THE PAST WEEK I HAVE FELT:
not at all some of the time all of the tir
ANGER 1 2 3 j , 11 5 6 ||
DESPAIR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SHAME WW® - lliii1 3 1 4 5 7
ANXIETY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
HAPPINESS : 1 2 3 4 1! 5 6 7
FRUSTRATION l 2 3 4 5 6 7
MISERY ;
. l 2 3 4 5 6 7
GUILT l 2 3 4 5 6 7
NERVOUSNESS l 2 3 4 5 6 7
JOY l 2 3 4 5 6 7
IRRITATION l 2 3 4 5 6 7
GLOOMINESS l 2 3 4 5 6 7
HUMILIATED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TENSE l 2 3 4 5 6 7
LOVING 1 2 3 4 5 6 ' 7
AGGRESSION l 2 3 4 5 6 7
MOURNFUL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
BLAMEWORTHY l 2 3 4 5 6 7
WORRIED l 2 3 4 5 6 7
CHEERFUL l 2 3 4 5 6 7
In the second part of this questionnaire we would like to know about how you feel IN GENERAL.
The question asks about HOW OFTEN you feel the emotion.
Again, for each question please circle ONE number only between 1 and 7 to indicate how you feel.
















































































































































In the third part of this questionnaire we would like to ask you for some information about HOWWELL YOU FEEL YOU COPE when you experience that emotion. For example, you might feelcompletely out of control of the emotion, or overwhelmed by the emotion in some other way.
Please note: even if you never experience a particular emotion, please answer the question byimagining how you think you would feel if you did experience that emotion.




ANGER 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
DESPAIR 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
SHAME 1 2 '' 4 5 6 7















MISERY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
GUILT 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
NERVOUSNESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
JOY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
IRRITATION 1 2 3 4 5 6 : 7
GLOOMINESS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
HUMILIATED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
TENSE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
LOVING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
AGGRESSION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
MOURNFUL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
BLAMEWORTHY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
WORRIED 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
CHEERFUL 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by circling a number
next to it. Use the scale below to make your choice.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Never Very seldom Seldom true Sometimes Frequently Almost Always true
true true true true always true
Its OK if I remember something pleasant. 2 3 4 5 6 7
2. My painful experiences and memories make it difficult 2 3 4 5 6 7for me to live a life that I would value.
3. I'm afraid of my feelings. 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. I worry about not being able to control my worries 2 3 4 5 6 7and feelings.
5_: My painful memories prevent me from having a 2 3 4 5 6 7
fulfilling life.
6. I am in control of my life. 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. Emotions cause problems in my life. 2 3 4 5 6 7
8. It seems like most people are handling their lives 2 3 4 5 6 7better than I am.
9. Worries get in the way of my success. 2 3 4 5 6 7
10. My thoughts and feelings do not get in the way of 2 3 4 5 6 7how I want to live my life.
APPENDIX la (iii)
SCQ
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Below you will find a list of statements. Please rate how true each statement is for you by circling a number
next to it.
Completely Compl
Disagree Disagree Agree Agrc
I am not embarrassed to let people know my opinions. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I seem to be very unlucky. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I'm easy to like 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
If a task is difficult that just makes me all the more
determined.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
There are lots of things I'd change about myself if I
could,













I don't care what happens to me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I have control over my own life. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Most people find me reasonably attractive. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I'm glad I'm who I am. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Most people would take advantage over me if they could. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I am a reliable person. 1 2 3 4
..........
6 7
It would be boring if I talked about myself. 1 2 4 5 6 7
When I'm successful there's usually a lot of luck involved. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I have a pleasant personality. 1 2 3 4 : 5 6 7
I never feel down in the dumps for very long. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I often feel humiliated. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I can usually make my mind up and stick to it. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Everyone else seems much more confident and contented
than me.
Even when I quite enjoy myself there doesn't seem much













I often worry about what other people are thinking about
me.
There's a lot of truth in the saying: "what will be, will
be."
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I look awful these days. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
If I really try I can overcome most of my problems. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
It's pretty tough to be me. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I feel emotionally mature. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
When people criticise me I often feel helpless and second
rate.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
When progress is difficult, I often find myself thinking
it's just not worth the effort.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
I can like myself even when others don't. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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These questions are concerned with beliefs people have about their thinking. Listed below are a number of
beliefs that people have expressed. Please read each item and say how much you generallyagree with it by
circling the appropriate number. Please respond to all the items, there are no right or wrong answers.
Do not Agree Agree Agree
Agree slightly moderately very much
1. Worrying helps me to avoid problems in the future 12 3 4
2. My worrying is dangerous for me 12 3 4
3. I think a lot about my thoughts 1 2 3 4
4. I could make myself sick with worrying 12 3 4
5. I am aware of the way my mind works when I am 1 2 3 4
thinking through a problem
6. If I did not control a worrying thought, and then 12 3 4
it happened, it would be my fault
7. I need to worry in order to remain organised 12 3 4
8. I have little confidence in my memory for words 12 3 4
and names
9. My worrying thoughts persist no matter how hard .j. 2 3 4
I try to stop them
10. Worrying helps me to get things sorted out in my 1 2 3 4
mind
11. I cannot ignore my worrying thoughts 12 3 4
12. I monitor my thoughts 12 3 4
13. I should be in control of my thoughts all of the 1 2 3 4
time
14. My memory can mislead me at times 12 3 4
15. My worrying could make me go mad 12 3 4
16. I am constantly aware of my thinking 12 3 4
17. I have a poor memory 1 2 3 4
18. I pay close attention to the way my mind works 12 3 4
19. Worrying helps me cope 1 2 3 4
20. Not being able to control my thoughts is a sign of ^ 2 3 4
weakness
21. When I start worrying, I cannot stop 1 2 3 4
22. I will be punished for not controlling certain 12 3 4
thoughts
23. Worrying helps me to solve problems 1 2 3 4
24. I have little confidence in my memory for places 12 3 4
25. It is bad to think certain thoughts 12 3 4
26. I do not trust my memory 12 3 4
27. If I could not control my thoughts, I would not be 1 2 3 4
able to function
28. I need to worry, in order to work well 12 3 4
29. I have little confidence in my memory for actions 12 3 4
30. I constantly examine my thoughts 12 3 4
APPENDIX la (v)
SIQ
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Listed below are conditions you may or may not have experienced. For each condition, please circle theletter next to each reason or group of reasons that corresponds to how much that might explain thecondition. Please check every item for each question. Also, answer whether you have had the condition inthe last 3 months by circling A (YES) or B (NO). Please answer all questions.
A B C bNot at all Somewhat Quite a bit A great deal
1. If I had a prolonged headache, I would probably think that it isbecause:
2.
I am emotionally upset A B C bThere is something wrong with my muscles, nerves or brain A B C DA loud noise, bright light or something else has irritated me A B C bOther. Please specify A B C b
Have you had a prolonged headache in the last 3 months A--Yes B-No
If I was sweating a lot, I would probably think that it is because:I must have a fever or infection
A B C bI'm anxious or nervous
A B C DThe room is too warm, I'm overdressed or working too hard A B C bOther. Please specify. A B C b
Have you noticed yourself sweating a lot in the past 3 months?If I got dizzy all of a sudden, I would probably think it is because:There is something wrong with my heart or blood pressureI am not eating enough or I got up too quickly
I must be under a lot of stress
Other. Please specify;
A--Yes B- No
A || C b
A B C b
A B C b
A B C b
Have you felt dizzy in the last 3 months?
If I noticed my mouth was dry, I would probably think that it isbecause:
A-Yes B-No
I must be scared or anxious about something A B C DI need to drink more liquids A B C DThere is something wrong with my salivary glands A B C DOther. Please specify. A B C D
Have you had a dry mouth in the last 3 months? A-Yes B-■NoIf I felt my heart pounding in my chest, I would probably think thatit is because:
I've exerted myself or drunk a lot of coffee
I must really be excited or afraid
There must be something wrong with my heart
Other. Please specify.
A B C b
A B C b
A B C D
A B C D
Have you noticed your heart pounding in the last 3 months? A-Yes B-No
6. If I felt fatigued, I would probably think that it is because:
I'm emotionally exhausted or discouraged A B C D
I've been over exerting myself or not exercising enough A B C b
I'm anaemic or my blood is weak A B
C D
Other. Please specify. A
B C D
Have you felt fatigued in the last 3 months? A-Yes B-No
If I noticed my hand trembling, I would probably think that it is
because:
I might have some sort of neurological problem A B
C D
I'm very nervous
A B C D
I've tired the muscle in my hand A B
c D
Other. Please Specify. A
B C D
Have you noticed your hands trembling in the last 3 months? A-Yes B- No
If I had trouble sleeping, I would probably think that it is because:
Some kind of pain or physical discomfort is keeping me awake A B C b
I'm not tired or I had too much coffee A B C
D
I'm worrying too much or I must be nervous about something A B C 0
Other. Please specify. A
B C D
Have you had trouble sleeping in the last 3 months? A- Yes B--No
If my stomach was upset, I would probably think that it is because:
I've worried myself sick A
B C D
I have the flu or stomach irritation A B
C D
I've had something to eat that would not agree with me A B C D
Other. Please specify. A
B C b
Have you had an upset stomach in the last 3 months? A-Yes B -No
If I lost my appetite, I would probably think that it is because:
I've been eating too much or my body does not need as much food as A B C b
before
I'm worrying so much that food just doesn't taste good anymore A B C
b
I have some stomach or intestinal problem A B
C D
Other. Please specify.
A B c D
Have you lost your appetite in the last 3 months? A -Yes
B -No
If I had a hard time catching my breath, I would probably think that
it is because:
My lungs are congested from infection, irritation or heart trouble A B c D
The room is stuffy or there is too much pollution in the air A B c D
I'm over excited or anxious
A B c D
Other. Please specify.
A B c D
Have you had a hard time catching your breath in the last 3 months? A-Yes B-No
12. If I noticed numbness or tingling in my hands or feet, I would
probably think that it is because:
I'm under emotional stress
There is something wrong with my nerves or blood circulation
I am cold or my hand or foot went to sleep
Other. Please specify.
Have you had numbness or tingling in your hands or feet in the last 3
months?
13. If I was constipated or irregular, I would probably think that it is
because:
There is not enough fruit or fibre in my diet
Nervous tension is keeping me from being regular
There is something wrong with my bowels or intestines
Other. Please specify.
Have you been constipated or irregular in the last 3 months? A-Yes B-No
A B C b
A B C D
A B C D
A B C b
A-Yes B--No
A B C b
A B C b
A B C b
A B c b
Thank You Very Much For Your Help With This Questionnaire
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STAI
Wendy Prentice 146 D. Clin. Psychol
* MULO I I VI illMlflU
Developed by C. D. Spielberger, R. L. Gorsuch and R. Lushene
STAI FORM X-1
NAME - — - DATE—=
DIRECTIONS: A number of statements which people have
used to describe themselves are given below. Read each state*-
ment and then blacken in the appropriate circle to the right of
the statement to indicate how you feel right now, that is, at o
this moment. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not >
spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer >
which seems to describe your present feelings best. P
1. I feel calm - © © © ©
2. I feel secure © © © ©
3. I am tense © © © ©
4. I am regretful - © © © ©
5. I feel at ease : © © © ©
6. I feel upset © © . ©
7. I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes © © © ©
8. I feel rested © © © ©
9. I feel anxious © © © ©
10. I feel comfortable © © © ©
11. I feel self-confident © © © ©
12. I feel nervous © © © ©
13. I am jittery © , ® © ©
14. I feel "high strung" - © © © ©
15. I am relaxed — © © © ©
16. I feel content . © © © ©
17. I am worried © © © ©
18 I feel over-excited and "rattled" © © © 0
19. I feel joyful © © © ©
20. I feel pleasant - © © © ' ©
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APPENDIX lc
PDI
Wendy Prentice 147 D. Clin. Psychol
P.D.I.-21
This questionnaire is designed to measure beliefs and vivid mental experiences. We believe that they are much more
common than has previously been supposed., and that most people have had some such experiences during their lives,
PleaSe answer the following questions as honestly as you can. There are no right or wrong answers, and there are no trick
questions.
Please note that we arc NOT interested in experiences people may have had when under the influence ofdrugs,
IT IS IMPORTANT THAT YOU ANSWERALL QUESTIONS.
For the questions you answer YES to, we arc interested in:
(a) how distressing tliese beliefs or experiences are
(b) how often you think about them; and
(c) how true you believe them to be.
On the right hand side of the page we would like yog to circle the number which corresponds most closely to how dis¬
tressing this belief is, liow often you think about it, and how much you believe that it is true.
If you answerNO please move on to the next question.
Example










Hardly ever Think about it
think about it all the time
1 2 3 4 5
Dont believe
it's true




Do you ever feel as if you could read









Hardly ever Think about it
think about it all the time









,or Not at all
distressing




Hardly ever Think about it
—► think about it ail the time
t 2 3 4 5
Don't believe
it's true




7) Do you ever feel that you are a

















1 2 3 4 5
8) Do you ever feel that you are

















1 2 3 4 5











Hardly ever 1 hirik about it
think about it all the time
1 2 3 4 5
Don't believe
it's true




10) Do you ever feci as if electrical j Not at all
devices such as computers can ! distressing
Veiy
distressing









-| 2 3 4 5
Don't believe Believe it is
16) Do you ever feel as if you had Hot at all Very
no thoughts in your head at all ? distressing distressing
xr 1 2 3 4 5
Hardly ever Think about it
NO YES > think about it ail the time
1 2 3 4 5
(please circle) " Don't believe Believe it is
ifs true absolutely true
1 2 3 4 5
17) Do you ever feel as if the world












1 2 3 4 5
Don't believe Believe it is
it's true absolutely true
1 2 3 4 5
1S) Do your thoughts ever feel alien Not at all Very
to you in some way ? distressing distressing
1 2 3 4 5
Hardly ever Think about it
NO YES > think about it all the time
1 2 3 4 5
(please circle) Don't believe Believe it is
it's tare absolutely true
1 2 3 4 5
19) Have your thoughts ever been so Not at all Very
vivid that you were worried other distressing distressing
people would hear them ? xr 1 2 3 4 5
Hardly ever Think about it
NO YES — think about it all the time
1 2 3 4 5
(please circle) Don't believe B^hcve « is
it's true absolutely true
1 2 3 4 5
20) Do you ever feel as if your own










Hardlv ever Think about it
think about it all the time
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Summary of a Research Project Being Carried out in Monklands Psychology kept
Dear Clinician,
I would really appreciate your help in recruiting clients/patients who experience delusions and
have a diagnosis of delusional disorder or schizophrenic spectrum disorder based on DSM-IV
criteria, and those who meet DSM-IV criteria for Panic disorder, for inclusion in my research.
This involves sending out or giving invitations to those who meet the inclusion/exclusion criteria.
I am currently undertaking a Doctorate course in Clinical Psychology at the University of
Edinburgh, and being in my third year I am required to carry out a piece of research as part
fulfillment of the course. I am interested in why individuals experiencing psychosis report
different interpretations of bodily sensations than, for instance panic disordered patients
or the general population (see research proposal). This research has implications for the further
understanding and development of existing Psychological treatments for delusions.
As research in this area requires experience and skill with interviewing this client group, and
because you have a duty of care to your patients, I feel it is relevant to give you some information
about my stage of training and some of the research governance procedures that have been
put in place. The qualifications I have earned so far are a BSc (Hons) undergraduate degree in
Psychology and an MSc postgraduate degree in Psychology and Health, and I am due to complete a
4 year Doctorate degree in Clinical Psychology (D. Clin. Psychol) in 2008. During this time I have
carried out 2 large and 4 small scale pieces of research. I also have five years of clinical
experience of working with clients of all age groups with a wide variety of mental health
difficulties within Psychology departments in Lanarkshire. In addition, I have trained in Cognitive
Behavioural Therapy (CBT) for psychosis, prodromal monitoring for psychosis A bipolar disorder,
and Behavioural Family Therapy (BFT). I have an academic as well as a clinical supervisor to ensure
that patients are well supported throughout their participation in the research, and ethics
approval has been gained from the local research and ethics committee (LREC) and the research
and development (RAD) departments in Lanarkshire.
This piece of research involves identifying interpretations of somatic symptoms in two client
groups;
1. Individuals who experience delusions and have a diagnosis of delusional disorder or
schizophrenic spectrum disorder based on DSM-IV criteria.
2. Individuals who meet DSM-IV criteria for Panic disorder.
To ensure validity of the study, 15 participants for each group are required. I would really
appreciate your help in the recruitment process. I would appreciate it if you could identify
possible participants from your caseload who meet the inclusion criteria of:
Delusions group: Adults between the ages of 18-65 currently experiencing
persecutory delusions, and who have a diagnosis of delusional disorder or
schizophrenic spectrum disorder based on DSM-IV criteria.
Panic group: Adults between the ages of 18-65 who meet DSM-IV criteria for Panic
disorder.
Please also bear in mind the exclusion criteria of:
Delusions group: Organic or drug induced basis for the delusions.
Panic group: The presence of delusions, or a first-degree relative with a diagnosis of
schizophrenia.
Both groups: Severe substance abuse. If participants are abusing substances, their
answers will not reflect clearly their mental health state.
Once the potential participants have been identified as meeting the criteria, could you please send
out, or give them the information sheet/consent form provided by way of invitation to participate
in the research? If they are interested in participating they will be required to fill the consent
form out and send it back to me in a stamped addressed envelope provided. Please advise potential
participants to wait at least 24 hours before providing consent. Following receipt of the consent
form, I will contact the patient to arrange a suitable time to meet with me on an individual basis.
On meeting with me, the participants will be briefed fully about the aims of the study and what is
required of them. Each participant will be given the questionnaires, and once completed, the
questionnaires will be returned anonymously. Participants will have privacy while filling in the
questionnaires, and all questionnaires will remain anonymous and confidential.
I hope to finish recruiting by December 2007, so we have a lot of time to identify potential
participants and collect the data. I am happy to present the results to those involved in the
recruitment process if you are interested. Your help in the recruitment process is hugely valued
so I thank you in advance for your help.
Yours sincerely,
Wendy Prentice
Clinical Psychologist in Training
APPENDIX 3
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Dear potential participant, Lanarkshire
I am currently studying Clinical Psychology at the University of Edinburgh, and as
part fulfilment of the course I am required to carry out a piece of research. This
research is a study of physical sensations, emotions, beliefs, and thoughts to see how
these differ between people who suffer different types of mental health problems,
and people who do not experience any mental health problems. We hope to gain a
greater understanding of mental health issues so that Psychological treatment can be
tailored to the needs of individuals experiencing these types of problems.
You are invited to take part in this research, which will involve meeting with me to fill
in questionnaires which include questions about your thoughts and beliefs regarding
your experience of physical symptoms, as well as other questions relating to your
beliefs and emotions. I estimate that your involvement in this study will take
approximately one hour of your time in total, and you can withdraw from taking part
at any time. Please be aware that withdrawing from this research will not affect your
medical or psychological care. All information that you provide will be anonymous and
kept strictly confidential.
If you are interested in taking part, please fill out the enclosed form and give it to a
member of staff that is responsible for your care (e.g. Psychologist, Psychiatrist,
Nurse etc.), or post it using the stamp addressed envelope to the address below. You
will then be contacted to arrange a suitable time to meet with myself.
Please keep this form in a safe place so that if you feel distressed by the research
you can contact the following individuals for support: Wendy Prentice or James
Dickinson on 01236 712564, or David Gillanders on 0131 6513946. In addition, if you
have concerns about the manner in which the re.se.arch is being carried out you can
contact Karen McKenzie on 0131 6513953.
Thank you for considering taking part in this research. I look forward to meeting








I would like to participate in the research outlined. j j (please tick)





Please indicate who told you about this research?
Please return this form to your Doctor/Nurse. Alternatively you can return the form
in the stamp addressed envelope or to:
Wendy Prentice
Trainee Clinical Psychologist
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Telephone 0131 536 9026











Date: 28 May 2007
Your Ref.:
Our Ref.: 07/MRE00/54
Enquiries to: Walter Hunter
Extension: 89026
Direct Line: 0131536 9026
Email: walter.hunterf5)lhb. scot.nhs.uk
Dear Mrs Prentice
Study title: An exploration of interpretations of bodily symptoms between people
who experience psychosis, anxiety and healthy controls
REC reference: 07/MRE00/54
The Scotland A Research Ethics Committee reviewed the above application at the meeting held on
24 May 2007. Thank you for attending to discuss the study.
Ethical opinion
The Committee noted that this application had been submitted to Lanarkshire REC but transferred
to Committee A because of the potential to recruit incapacitated adults. The Committee confirmed
that this study did not require the inclusion of incapacitated adults and agreed with the chief
investigator that it could therefore have been reviewed by another committee. Patients who
consented to participate but later lost capacity are still considered to have given valid consent. The
Committee had no major ethical concerns other than the intention to store data on a home computer
and the possibility of accessing records before a potential participant had consented. Mrs Prentice
agreed that although she was involved in the treatment of some of the patients she would not
approach or access the records of those patients with which she had no clinical relationship. Mrs
Prentice also agreed not to store data on a home computer but would look to have access to
resources at NHS Lanarkshire. The Committee also agreed that the study should be exempt from
site specific assessment.
The members of the Committee present gave a favourable ethical opinion of the above research on
the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting documentation.
The Committee also the following observations and delegated their Scientific Adviser to consider
your response:
1. The participant information sheet should:
Chairman Professor Kennedy Lees
Vice-Chairman Dr George Masterton
NHS
SCOTLAND
Participant Information Sheet * 1 09 March 2007
Participant Consent Form 1 09 March 2007
* to be confirmed
Research governance approval
You should arrange for all relevant NHS care organisations to be notified that the research will be
taking place, and provide a copy of the REC application, the protocol and this letter.
All researchers and research collaborators who will be participating in the research at a NHS site
must obtain research governance approval from the relevant care organisation before commencing
any research procedures. Where a substantive contract is not held with the care organisation, it may
be necessary for an honorary contract to be issued before approval for the research can be given.
Membership of the Committee
The members of the Ethics Committee who were present at the meeting are listed on the attached
sheet.
Statement of compliance
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for Research Ethics
Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for Research
Ethics Committees in the UK.
REC reference number: 07/MRE00/54-Please quote this number on all correspondence




cc: Mrs Marise Bucukoglu
Clinical Trials and Research Governance Manager
Room El. 06, Oueen's Medical Research Institute
47 Little France Crescent
Edinburgh EH16 4SA
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Test results of homogeneity of variance and normal distribution.
ANOVA assumes that the data are sampled from populations with identical SDs
(homogeneity of variance). This assumption is tested using the method of Bartlett. If
the test is significant then non-parametric tests should be considered. ANOVA
assumes that the data are sampled from populations that follow normal distributions.
This assumption is tested using the method of Kolmogorov and Smirnov (KS). If the
results are significant then non parametric test should be considered. Results of
these tests for all three groups on all dependent variables are shown below (see Table
1).
Table 1. Statistical analyses of homogeneity of variance and normal distribution
Variable Bartlett KS (p value) Passed Statistical
statistic Delusion Panic Healthy normality tests used
(p value) group group control
group
test?
State Anxiety 5.973 0.1188 0.1882 0.2149 Yes Non-
(0.0501) (>0.10) (>0.10) (0.0607) but outliers
exist
Parametric
Trait Anxiety 3.794 0.1906 0.1631 0.1766 Yes Non-
(0.1500) (>0.10) (>0.10) (>0.10) but outliers
exist
Parametric
Psychological 2.530 0.1745 0.2227 0.1988 Yes Parametric
interpretations (0.2822) (>0.10) (>0.10) (>0.10)
Somatic 3.749 0.1606 0.1562 0.1548 Yes Non-
Interpretations (0.1534) (>0.10) (>0.10) (>0.10) but outliers
exist
Parametric
Normal 0.6960 0.1740 0.1616 0.1320 Yes Parametric
interpretations (0.7061) (>0.10) (>0.10) (>0.10)
No. of Somatic 1.320 0.1658 0.2658 0.1639 No Non-
Interpretations (0.5168) (>0.10) (0.0288) (>0.10) Parametric
in past 3
months
Metacognitions 2.053 0.1505 0.2637 0.2202 No Non-
(0.3582) (>0.10) (0.0313) (0.0487) Parametric
Metacognitions 4.298 0.1622 0.2165 0.3147 No Non-
subscale (0.1166) (>0.10) (>0.10) (0.0003) Parametric
positive beliefs
about worry
Metacognitions 1.474 0.1205 0.1605 0.2607 No Non-
subscale (0.4784) >0.10 >0.10 (0.0072) Parametric
Cognitive
confidence
Metacognitions 2.590 0.1625 0.1806 0.2607 No Non-
subscale (0.2739) (>0.10) (>0.10) (0.0072) Parametric
uncontrollability
and danger
Metacognitions 0.8051 0.2288 0.2423 0.2735 No Non-
subscale need (0.6686) (0.0248) (0.0703) (0.0036) Parametric
to control
thoughts
Metacognitions 1.979 0.08763 0.2500 0.1640 Yes Parametric
subscale (0.3718) (>0.10) (0.0531) (>0.10)
cognitive self
consciousness
Self Esteem 3.527 0.1217 0.1809 0.1358 Yes but Non-
(0.1715) >0.10 >0.10 >0.10 outliers
exist
Parametric
State 5.724 0.1130 0.1423 0.1622 Yes Parametric
emotionality (0.0572) (>0.10) (>0.10) (>0.10)
Trait 11.190 0.1622 0.2274 0.1610 No Non-
Emotionality (0.0037) >0.10 >0.10 >0.10 Parametric
Experiential 8.594 0.1975 0.1694 0.1290 No Non-
Avoidance (0.0136) 0.0956 >0.10 >0.10 Parametric
Delusional 19.328 0.1300 0.1515 0.2108 No Non-
Ideation (<.0001) (>0.10) (>0.10) (0.0716) Parametric
PDI Yes/No 6.000 0.1367 0.1422 0.2270 No Non-
scores (0.0498) (>0.10) (>0.10) (0.0364) Parametric
PDI subscale 20.890 0.1420 0.1563 0.2545 No Non-
Delusional (<0.0001) (>0.10) (>0.10) (0.0098) Parametric
distress
PDI subscale 20.380 0.1482 0.1620 0.2152 No Non-
Delusional (<.0001) >0.10 >0.10 0.0600 Parametric
conviction
PDI subscale 20.776 0.1509 0.1512 0.2032 No Non-
Delusional (<.0001) >0.10 >0.10 0.0963 Parametric
preoccupation
APPENDIX 6
Raw data of 'other' interpretations
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Raw data of 'Other7 Interpretations
Delusion Group (9)
Participant 4
If my stomach was upset, I would probably think that it is because:
"woman's troubles"
Normal attribution = 1
Participant 5
If I had a prolonged headache, I would probably think that it is because:
"As I have a sore head"
If I had a hard time catching my breath, I would probably think it is because:
"Because I am not fit"
Normal attribution =1
Participant 8
If I had a prolonged headache, I would probably think that it is because:
"Stress"
If I felt fatigued, I would probably think that it is because:
"Lack of sleep"
If I noticed my hand trembling, I would probably think that it is because:
"Cold"
If I lost my appetite, I would probably think that it is because:
"Stress"
If I had a hard time catching my breath, I would probably think it is because:
"Asthma"
If I noticed numbness or tingling in my hands or feet, I would probably think that it is because:
"Fear"
If I was constipated or irregular, I would probably think that it is because:
"Not enough food in general"
Psychological attribution = 3
Normal attribution = 3
Somatic = 1
Participant 9
If I lost my appetite, I would probably think that it is because:
"Thinking too much about physical illness"
Psychological attribution = 1
Participant 10
If I was sweating a lot, I would think it is because:
"Maybe outside forces"
If I got dizzy all of a sudden, I would probably think it is because:
"Maybe I'm just weak"
Ambiguous=2
Participant 11
If I noticed my mouth was dry, I would probably think that it is because:
"due to drug I'm on"
If I lost my appetite, I would probably think that it is because:
"Could be due to cancer or some other illness"
If I had a hard time catching my breath, I would probably think it is because:
"Exertion"





If I had a prolonged headache, I would probably think that it is because:
"Lack of sleep"
If I was sweating a lot, I would think it is because:
"Blood pressure"
If I noticed my mouth was dry, I would probably think that it is because:
"Medication"
If I felt fatigued, I would probably think that it is because:
"Lack of sleep"
If I noticed my hand trembling, I would probably think that it is because:
"Lack of sleep"
If I had trouble sleeping, I would probably think it was because:
"Hearing voices, threats"
If my stomach was upset, I would probably think that it is because:
"Diurnal ulcer"
If I had a hard time catching my breath, I would probably think that it is because:
"Smoking"






If I had a prolonged headache, I would probably think that it is because:
"Too much on my mind"
If I noticed my mouth was dry, I would probably think that it is because:
"Medication"
If I lost my appetite, I would probably think that it is because:
"don't like food"





If I noticed my mouth was dry, I would probably think that it is because:
"Side effect of medication"
If I felt my heart pounding in my chest, I would probably think that it is because:
"Gentle exercise"
If I felt fatigued, I would probably think that it is because:
"Medication"
If I was constipated or irregular, I would probably think that it is because:
"Medication"
Normal = 4
Healthy control group (3)
Participant 4
If I got dizzy all of a sudden, I would probably think it is because:
"Viral infection symptom"
If I had trouble sleeping, I would probably think it was because:








If I had a prolonged headache, I would probably think that it is because:
"Tension-bad posture"
If I felt fatigued, I would probably think that it is because:
"Not sleeping enough"
If I lost my appetite, I would probably think that it is because:





If I felt my heart pounding in my chest, I would probably think that it is because:
"If I panic in a situation and have stabbing pains in my chest would perhaps think there
might be something wrong" (This was beside an asterisk linked to the 'There must be
something wrong with my heart' option).
Somatic = 1
Participant 2
If I was constipated or irregular, I would probably think that it is because:
"Problem due to operation 2 years ago"
Somatic = 1
Participant 3
If I lost my appetite, I would probably think that it is because:
"Anxious"





If I had a prolonged headache, I would probably think that it is because:
"Medication and migraine"
If I got dizzy all of a sudden, I would probably think it is because:
"Result of medication"
If I noticed my mouth was dry, I would probably think that it is because:
"Also as a result of medication"
If I felt my heart pounding in my chest, I would probably think that it is because:
"Prone to panic attacks"
If I noticed my hand trembling, I would probably think that it is because:
"Again as a result of medication"
If I had trouble sleeping, I would probably think it was because:
"Have always had difficulty sleeping"
If my stomach was upset, I would probably think that it is because:
"Again medication"
If I lost my appetite, I would probably think that it is because:
"Just don't feel like eating"
If I noticed numbness or tingling in my hands or feet, I would probably think that it is because:
"Have arthritis in neck"
If I was constipated or irregular, I would probably think that it is because:




If I had a prolonged headache, I would probably think that it is because:
"Lack of sleep"
If I was sweating a lot, I would think it is because:
"Medication"
If I noticed my mouth was dry, I would probably think that it is because:
"Diabetes"
If I felt fatigued, I would probably think that it is because:
"Not sleeping"
If I had trouble sleeping, I would probably think it was because:
"Child not sleeping"
If my stomach was upset, I would probably think that it is because:
"Eaten too much"
If I had a hard time catching my breath, I would probably think that it is because:
"Asthma"
If I noticed numbness or tingling in my hands or feet, I would probably think that it is because:
"Sciatica"
Normal = 5
Somatic = 3
